Justice -- Early works to 1800; Political science -- Early works to 1800; Utopias -- Early works to 1800
For those who rule must not be those
who are desirous to rule; and, if you can offer to our citizens a better
life than that of rulers generally is, there will be a chance that the
rich, not only in this world's goods, but in virtue and wisdom, may bear
rule. And the only life which is better than the life of political
ambition is that of philosophy, which is also the best preparation for the
government of a State.
Then now comes the question,--How shall we create our rulers; what way is
there from darkness to light? The change is effected by philosophy; it is
not the turning over of an oyster-shell, but the conversion of a soul from
night to day, from becoming to being. And what training will draw the soul
upwards? Our former education had two branches, gymnastic, which was
occupied with the body, and music, the sister art, which infused *522* a
natural harmony into mind and literature; but neither of these sciences
gave any promise of doing what we want. Nothing remains to us but that
universal or primary science of which all the arts and sciences are
partakers, I mean number or calculation. 'Very true.' Including the art of
war? 'Yes, certainly.' Then there is something ludicrous about Palamedes
in the tragedy, coming in and saying that he had invented number, and had
counted the ranks and set them in order. For if Agamemnon could not count
his feet (and without number how could he?) he must have been a pretty
sort of general indeed. No man should be a soldier who cannot count, and
indeed he is hardly to be called a man. But I am not speaking of these
practical applications of arithmetic, *523* for number, in my view, is
rather to be regarded as a conductor to thought and being. I will explain
{cii} what I mean by the last expression:--Things sensible are of two
kinds; the one class invite or stimulate the mind, while in the other the
mind acquiesces. Now the stimulating class are the things which suggest
contrast and relation. For example, suppose that I hold up to the eyes
three fingers--a fore finger, a middle finger, a little finger--the sight
equally recognizes all three fingers, but without number cannot further
distinguish them. Or again, suppose two objects to be relatively great and
small, these ideas of greatness and smallness are supplied not by the
sense, but by the mind. *524* And the perception of their contrast or
relation quickens and sets in motion the mind, which is puzzled by the
confused intimations of sense, and has recourse to number in order to find
out whether the things indicated are one or more than one. Number replies
that they are two and not one, and are to be distinguished from one
another. Again, the sight beholds great and small, but only in a confused
chaos, and not until they are distinguished does the question arise of
their respective natures; we are thus led on to the distinction between
the visible and intelligible. That was what I meant when I spoke of
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