And in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and *334D* evil to the good? Clearly. But the good are just and would not do an injustice? True. Then according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no wrong? Nay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral. Then I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the unjust? I like that better. [Sidenote: Mistakes will sometimes happen.] But see the consequence:--Many a man who is ignorant of human nature has friends who are bad friends, *334E* and in that case he ought to do harm to them; and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit; but, if so, we shall be saying the very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the meaning of Simonides. Very true, he said: and I think that we had better correct an error into which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words 'friend' and 'enemy.' What was the error, Polemarchus? I asked. We assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good. [Sidenote: Correction of the definition.] And how is the error to be corrected? [Sidenote: To appearance we must add reality. He is a friend who 'is' as well as 'seems' good, And we should do good to our good friends and harm to our bad enemies.] We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as {11} seems, good; *335A* and that he who seems only, and is not good, only seems to be and is not a friend; and of an enemy the same may be said. You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies? Yes. And instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do good to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say: It is just to do good to our friends when they are good and harm to our enemies when they are evil? *335B* Yes, that appears to me to be the truth. But ought the just to injure any one at all? Undoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies. [Sidenote: To harm men is to injure them; and to injure them is to make them unjust. But justice cannot produce injustice.] When horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated? The latter. Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs? Yes, of horses. And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of horses? Of course. *335C* And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the proper virtue of man? Certainly. And that human virtue is justice? To be sure. Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust? That is the result. [Sidenote: Illustrations.] But can the musician by his art make men unmusical? Certainly not. Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen? Impossible. And can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking *335D* generally, can the good by virtue make them bad? Assuredly not. Any more than heat can produce cold? It cannot. Or drought moisture? {12} [Sidenote: Socrates, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus.] Clearly not.