Now there is no consistency in this opinion, taken in the general sense intended by its author. For in the first place it immediately follows from thence, that there is no force in treaties between kings and different nations, till some part of them be carried into execution, especially in those places, where no certain form of treaties or compacts has been established. But no just reason can be found, why laws, which are a kind of general agreement among a people, and indeed are called so by Aristotle, and Demosthenes, should be able to give the force of obligation to compacts, and why the will of an individual, doing every thing to bind himself, should not have the same power; especially where the civil law creates no impediment to it. Besides, as it has been already said that the property of a thing may be transferred, where a sufficient indication of the will is given. Why may we not then convey to another the right to claim a transfer of our property to him, or the fulfilment of our engagements, as we have the same power over our actions, as over our property? This is an opinion confirmed by the wisdom of all ages. For as it is said by legal authorities, that since nothing is so consonant to natural justice, as for the will of an owner, freely transferring his property to another, to be confirmed, so nothing is more conducive to good faith among men, than a strict adherence to the engagements they have made with each other. Thus a legal decision for the payment of money, where no debt has been incurred, except by the verbal consent of the party promising, is thought conformable to natural justice. Paulus the Lawyer also says, that the law of nature and the law of nations agree in compelling a person, who has received credit, to payment. In this place the word, COMPELLING, signifies a moral obligation. Nor can what Connanus says be admitted, which is, that we are supposed to have credit for a full performance of a promise, where the engagement has been in part fulfilled. For Paulus in this place is treating of an action where nothing is due; which action is entirely void, if money has been paid, in any way, whether according to the manner expressly stipulated, or any other. For the civil law, in order to discourage frequent causes of litigation, does not interfere with those agreements which are enforced by the law of nature and of nations. Tully, in the first book of his Offices, assigns such force to the obligation of promises, that he calls fidelity the foundation of justice, which Horace also styles the sister of justice, and the Platonists often call justice, TRUTH, which Apuleius has translated FIDELITY, and Simonides has defined justice to be not only returning what one has received, but also speaking the truth. But to understand the matter fully, we must carefully observe that there are three different ways of speaking, respecting things which ARE, or which, it is supposed, WILL be in our power.