International law; Natural law; War (International law)
Other forms too besides those already named, and the subject itself,
will frequently supply no improbable grounds of conjecture. But if the
conjectures are equal on both sides, it will remain that favourable
treaties are supposed to be real or permanent, and odious ones only
personal. All treaties of peace or commerce are favourable. Yet all
treaties of war are not odious, especially those of the defensive
kind, such a character belonging only to offensive wars, from the
contemplation of the calamities which they inflict. It is presumed too,
that in the formation of treaties, the character of each party is taken
into the account, and that both are persuaded that neither of them will
commence hostilities, but from just and important causes.
What is usually said of societies terminating with the death of the
parties, has no connection with this subject, but relates to private
societies, the cognizance of which belongs to the civil law. Whether
it was right or wrong therefore in the people of Fidenae, the Latins,
Tuscans and Sabines, upon the death of Romulus, Tullus, Ancus, Priscus,
Servius, to abandon the respective treaties made with those kings, it
is impossible for us now to decide, those treaties being no longer
extant. On the same point, Justin maintains a discussion, whether
those states, which had been tributary to the Medes, were upon a
change of government, released from their obligations. For the thing
to be considered is, whether the convention with the Medes had been
a voluntary act of their own. Indeed the argument of Bodinus can by
no means be admitted, which is, that treaties made with kings extend
not to their successors; For the obligation of an oath is limited
to the person of him, who takes it. It is true that the oath itself
can bind only the person who takes it; yet the engagements, which it
confirms, will be binding upon his heirs. Nor is it to be taken for
an established maxim, that oaths are the only foundation, on which
treaties rest. The engagement itself is sufficiently binding, the oaths
being only added to give it the greater sanctity. In the Consulship
of Publius Valerius, the Roman people had taken an oath to muster at
the command of the Consul. Upon his death, he was succeeded by Lucius
Quintius Cincinnatus. Some of the tribunes began to quibble, pretending
that the people were released from their obligation. Upon which Livy,
in his third book, remarks, that "at that time they had not degenerated
into the disregard of religious obligations, which marked his age: nor
did every one allow himself a latitude in explaining oaths, and laws,
but thought that he was bound to conform to their literal meaning."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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