And upon this principle all wills and treaties ought to be interpreted. For as all cases could neither be foreseen nor expressed by the lawgiver, it is necessary to leave a power of excepting the cases, which he himself would have excepted if he were present. Yet this is not to be done upon light grounds; for that would be exercising a controul over the acts of another; but is only to be established upon the clearest evidence and strongest proofs. The clearest proof we can have of a want of equity, is where following the literal meaning of the words would be unlawful, that is, repugnant to natural or divine precepts. For such things, as are incapable of obligation, are necessarily to be excepted. Quintilian the elder, says, "some things although comprehended within the meaning of no law form a natural exception." Thus any one, who has promised to return a sword, that has been given up to him, ought not to return it into the hands of a madman, as danger might result from it to himself or to other innocent persons. Likewise a thing, which has been deposited with any one, ought not to be returned to the hands of the person, who gave the pledge, if the real owner demands it. I prove this says Triphonius to be justice, which assigns to every one his own without disturbing the still juster claims of another. For the reason, it has been already observed, is founded on the institution of property, which makes it unjust not to return a thing when the real owner is known. XXVII. The need of equity too will appear in cases, where following the literal meaning of the words will not be absolutely unlawful, yet, upon a fair estimation, will be found too hard and intolerable. It might impose a hardship inconsistent with the general condition of human nature, or, upon comparing the person and matter under consideration with each other, it might be found at variance with the general intent of all law, which is to prevent evil and to redress injury. Thus, if a person has lent a sum of money, or any other thing, for a CERTAIN time, he may justly require the repayment or restoration of it WITHIN that time, if he has great need of it himself: for acts of kindness are of such a nature, that no one can be supposed intentionally to bind himself thereby to manifest inconvenience or prejudice. In the same manner a sovereign, who has promised assistance to an ally, will, IN EQUITY, be excused from fulfilling his engagement, if he wants all his strength at home to ward off danger or hostilities. The grant also of immunities or privileges in ORDINARY cases, cannot be pleaded as an exemption or exception from the services, which the state in PARTICULAR emergencies requires.