VI. This seems the most proper place for reviewing those distinctions in the motives of punishment, which have been used by Plato in his Gorgias, and by Taurus the philosopher in a passage quoted by Gellius in the fourteenth chapter of his fifth book. These distinctions seem to result naturally from the end of all punishment. Plato indeed considers the amendment of the offender, and the example given to others, as the two principal motives: but Taurus has added a third, which he calls satisfaction, and which is defined by Clemens Alexandrinus, to be repayment of evil, contributing to the benefit of both the aggrieved and avenging party. Aristotle passing over example as a motive, confines the object of punishment to the amendment or correction of the offender. But Plutarch has not made the same omission: for he has said, that "where immediate punishment follows the execution of a heinous crime, it both operates to deter others from committing the same crime, and administers some degree of consolation to the injured and suffering person." And this is what Aristotle calls commutative justice. But these matters require a more minute inquiry. We may observe therefore that there is nothing contrary either to human or divine law, in punishments, which have the good of the offender, or that of the injured party, or of any persons whatsoever in view. The three proper ends are obtained by that kind of punishment, which some philosophers have called correction, some chastisement, and others admonition. Paulus the Lawyer, has given it the name of correction; Plato styles it a lesson of instruction, and Plutarch a medicine of the soul, reforming and healing the sufferer, while it operates as a painful remedy. For as all deliberate acts, by frequent repetition, produce a propensity, which ripens into habit, the best method of reforming vices in their earliest stage is to deprive them of their sweet savour by an infusion of subsequent pain. It is an opinion of the Platonists, repeated by Apuleius, that "impunity and the delay of reproof are more severe and pernicious to an offender than any punishment whatsoever," and, in the words of Tacitus, "violent disorders must be encountered with remedies proportionably strong."