International law; Natural law; War (International law)
XLI., XLII., XLIII. But certain precautions are necessary to prevent
us from being carried away by an opinion that civil customs, though
founded upon just reasons, and received among many nations, are to be
reckoned as a part of the law of nature. And in the next place, it is
necessary to guard against enumerating as prohibitions of natural law,
things which are not proved to be so, as certain kinds of marriages the
taking of interest for the use of money, and other positive injunctions
of the divine, or Mosaic law. The third rule is, to make an accurate
distinction between general principles, such as the duty of living
according to the dictates of reason, and those of a more particular
though not less obvious meaning; as the duty of forbearing to take what
belongs to another. To which many truths may be added though not quite
so easy of apprehension: among which may be named the cruelty of that
kind of punishment, which consists in revenge, delighting in the pain
of another. This is a method of proof similar to that which occurs in
mathematics, the process of which rises from self-evident truths to
demonstrations, the latter of which, though not intelligible to all
alike, upon due examination obtain assent.
As then in matters of civil law, ignorance is deemed an excuse, so with
respect to the law of nature, wherever infirmity of understanding forms
an invincible obstruction to the knowledge of its rules, such infirmity
may be alleged as a vindication. For as, in cases of unavoidable
ignorance a great degree of the guilt of sin is removed; so it is in
some measure softened wherever this ignorance subsists, though it may
be owing to former negligence. And for this reason, Aristotle compares
barbarians, in their rude, unformed state, to persons, whose appetites
are rendered sickly by disease. Plutarch also observes that there are
certain infirmities and disorders, which naturally infect the soul.
Once for all, by way of conclusion we may add that wars undertaken
to inflict punishment may be suspected of injustice, except there be
manifest and enormous aggressions, with other conspiring causes, to
vindicate nations for having recourse to arms.
XLIV. The progress of the work has necessarily led to the consideration
of offences against God; the propriety or impropriety of punishing
which by force of arms is a fit subject of inquiry.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account