International law; Natural law; War (International law)
It was shewn above that apprehensions from a neighbouring power are
not a sufficient ground for war. For to authorize hostilities as a
defensive measure, they must arise from the necessity, which just
apprehensions create; apprehensions not only of the power, but of the
intentions of a formidable state, and such apprehensions as amount
to a moral certainty. For which reason the opinion of those is by no
means to be approved of, who lay down as a just ground of war, the
construction of fortifications in a neighbouring country, with whom
there is no existing treaty to prohibit such constructions, or the
securing of a strong hold, which may at some future period prove a
means of annoyance. For as a guard against such apprehensions, every
power may construct, in its own territory, strong works, and other
military securities of the same kind, without having recourse to actual
war. One cannot but admire the character, which Tacitus has drawn
of the Chauci, a noble and high-spirited people of Germany, "who,
_he says_, were desirous of maintaining their greatness by justice,
rather than by acts of ungovernable rapacity and ambition--provoking
no wars, invading no countries, spoiling no neighbours to aggrandize
themselves,--yet, when necessity prompted, able to raise men with
arms in their hands at a moment's warning--a great population with a
numerous breed of horses to form a well mounted cavalry--and, with all
these advantages, upholding their reputation in the midst of peace."
VI.[55] Nor can the advantage to be gained by a war be ever pleaded as
a motive of equal weight and justice with necessity.
VII. and VIII. Neither can the desire of emigrating to a more
favourable soil and climate justify an attack upon a neighbouring
power. This, as we are informed by Tacitus, was a frequent cause of war
among the ancient Germans.
IX. There is no less injustice in setting up claims, under the pretence
of newly discovered titles, to what belongs to another.
Neither can the wickedness, and impiety, nor any other incapacity of
the original owner justify such a claim. For the title and right by
discovery can apply only to countries and places, that have no owner.
X. Neither moral nor religious virtue, nor any intellectual excellence
is requisite to form a good title to property. Only where a race of
men is so destitute of reason as to be incapable of exercising any act
of ownership, they can hold no property, nor will the law of charity
require that they should have more than the necessaries of life. For
the rules of the law of nations can only be applied to those, who are
capable of political or commercial intercourse: but not to a people
entirely destitute of reason, though it is a matter of just doubt,
whether any such is to be found.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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