International law; Natural law; War (International law)
But the law of nations now under consideration is of wider extent both
in its authority over persons, and its effects. For, as to persons,
not only those, who surrender their rights, or engage themselves
to servitude, are considered in the light of slaves, but all, who
are taken prisoners in public and solemn war, come under the same
description from the time that they are carried into the places, of
which the enemy is master.
Nor is the commission of crime requisite to reduce them to this
condition, but the fate of all is alike, who are unfortunately taken
within the territories of an enemy, upon the breaking out of war.
II. and III. In ancient times, while slavery was permitted to exist,
the offspring, born during captivity or servitude, continued in the
same condition as the parents.--The consequences of such rules were of
wide extent;--there was no cruelty, which masters might not inflict
upon their slaves;--there was no service, the performance of which they
might not compel;--the power even of life and death was in their hands.
However the Roman laws at length set bounds to such wanton power, at
least to the exercise of it within the Roman territories.
Every thing too, found upon the prisoner's person, became a lawful
prize to the captor. For as Justinian observes, one who was entirely in
the power of another could have no property of his own.
IV. and V. Incorporeal rights, gained by the enemy, along with the
person so captured, cannot be considered in the light of primary and
original acquisitions. And there are some rights so purely personal
in their nature, that they cannot be lost even by captivity, nor the
duties attached thereto ever be relinquished. Of such a nature was the
paternal right among the Romans. For rights of this kind cannot exist
but immediately with the person to whom they originally belonged.
All these rights to prizes, which were introduced by the law of
nations, were intended as an inducement to captors to refrain from
the cruel rigour of putting prisoners to death; as they might hope
to derive some advantage from sparing and saving them. From hence
Pomponius deduces the origin of the word, SERVUS, or SLAVE, being one,
who might have been put to death, but from motives of interest or
humanity had been saved.
VI. (being the IX. of the original.) It has long been a maxim,
universally received among the powers of Christendom, that prisoners
of war cannot be made slaves, so as to be sold, or compelled to the
hardships and labour attached to slavery. And they have with good
reason embraced the latter principle. As it would be inconsistent with
every precept of the law of charity, for men to refuse abandoning a
cruel right, unless they might be allowed to substitute another, of
great, though somewhat inferior rigour, in its place.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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