In defence of the retreat of Sir George Prevost, the opinion expressed by Lord Wellington to Lord Bathurst, in 1813, is quoted. Wellington advised the pursuance of a defensive policy, knowing that there were not then men sufficient in Canada for offensive warfare, and because by pursuing a defensive system, the difficulties and risk of offensive operations would be thrown upon the enemy, who would most probably be foiled. This opinion was verified to the letter. On the other hand, the authority of Wellington, who says to Sir George Murray, that after the destruction of the fleet on Lake Champlain, Prevost must have returned to Kingston, sooner or later, is valueless, inasmuch as His Grace in naming Kingston, had evidently mistaken the locality of the disaster, and must have fancied that Plattsburgh was Sackett's Harbour. He says that a naval superiority on the Canadian lakes is a _sine qua non_ in war on the frontier of Canada, even should it be defensive. But Lake Champlain is not one of the Canadian lakes, and, therefore, this justification of a military mistake is somewhat far-fetched. Sir George Prevost failed because he feared to meet the fate of Burgoyne, and he incurred deep and lasting censure because, when it was in his power, he did nothing to retrieve it. Historic truth, says the historian of Europe, compels the expression of an opinion that though proceeding from a laudable motive--the desire of preventing a needless effusion of human blood--the measures of Sir George Prevost were ill-judged and calamitous. Sir James Yeo accused Sir George Prevost of having unduly hurried the squadron on the lake into action, at a time when the _Confiance_ was unprepared for it; and when the combat did begin, of having neglected to storm the batteries, as had been agreed on, so as to have occasioned the destruction of the flotilla and caused the failure of the expedition.