The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914Pratt, Edwin A.
History
The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914
Pratt, Edwin A.
Railroads; Transportation, Military
Great as the confusion undoubtedly was at the points of despatch, it
was far surpassed by that which prevailed at stations to which trains
were sent regardless of any consideration as to whether or not they
could be unloaded there with such despatch as to avoid congestion.
No transfer stations--constituting the points beyond which only the
supplies wanted for immediate or early use at the extreme front should
be taken, the remainder being forwarded as wanted--had been arranged,
and the consignors, military or civil, had assumed that all supplies
should be sent in bulk to places as near to the troops as possible.
There were, consequently, many stations close to the frontier where the
rails leading to them were occupied for miles together by loaded wagons,
the number of which was being constantly added to by fresh arrivals.
Many of these wagons were, in fact, used as magazines or storehouses on
wheels. The same was, also, being done to a certain extent on the German
lines, though with this difference--that whereas in Germany there were
at the railway stations route commandants whose duty it was to enforce
the prompt unloading of wagons, in France there was no corresponding
authority. It suited the officers or the military department concerned
to keep the supplies in the wagons until they were wanted; and this
arrangement may have appeared an especially desirable one from their
point of view because if the army moved forward--or backward--the
supplies could be more readily moved with it if they were still in the
wagons.
For these various reasons, there were officers who gave the most
stringent orders that the wagons were not to be unloaded until their
contents were actually required. It was evidently a matter of no concern
to them that the wagons they were detaining might be wanted elsewhere,
and that, for lack of them, other troops might be experiencing a
shortage in their own supplies.
When the wagons were not deliberately kept loaded, it might still be
impossible for the unloading to be done because of there being no
military in attendance to do the work. As for the picking out, from
among the large number in waiting, of some one wagon the contents of
which were specially wanted, the trouble involved in this operation must
often have been far greater than if the wagon had been unloaded and the
supplies stored in the first instance.
Even the stations themselves got congested, under like conditions. The
Commissariat wanted to convert them into depôts, and the Artillery
sought to change them into arsenals. There were stations at which no
platform was any longer available and troops arriving by any further
train had to descend some distance away, several days elapsing before
their train could be moved from the place where it had pulled up. At
stations not thus blocked trains might be hours late in arriving, or
they might bring a squadron of cavalry when arrangements had been made
for receiving a battalion of infantry.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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