The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914Pratt, Edwin A.
History
The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914
Pratt, Edwin A.
Railroads; Transportation, Military
At the outset the trains were placed entirely under the orders of
officers commanding sections of the line; but the arrangement was found
unsatisfactory as the trains were constantly being rushed out regardless
of Traffic Department regulations, and sometimes without even a "line
clear" message. Having, also, the trains at their disposal, as they
considered officers commanding sections of the line often made use of
them to inspect posts between stations, other traffic being stopped
while the inspections were being made. On one occasion, when a large mob
of cattle was being sent to Pretoria and there were no mounted troops
available to convoy them, the expedient was resorted to of employing an
armoured train for the purpose. The train had to adapt its speed to the
rate of progress of the cattle alongside, and such was the interference
with other traffic that the entire length of railway on the Delagoa
main line was blocked until the cattle had reached their destination.
In fact, instead of assisting traffic by preventing the enemy from
interrupting it, the armoured trains caused, Sir Percy Girouard
declares, "more interruptions than the enemy themselves."
With a view both to meet these particular difficulties and to ensure
a better use of the trains, there was appointed an Assistant-Director
of Armoured Trains who was placed on the staff both of the
Commander-in-Chief and of the Director of Railways and had under his
control all the armoured trains in South Africa. Captain H. C. Nanton,
R.E., the officer so appointed, had practical acquaintance alike with
railway requirements and regulations and with armoured trains. In touch
with Headquarters, and kept informed as to which portions of the line
were most threatened by the enemy, it became his duty to order where
the trains should be sent. Once despatched to a particular section of
the line, an armoured train was to be under the control of the General
or other officer commanding that section. The Assistant-Director
had power to remove it, however, if he thought it was more urgently
required elsewhere. It was his duty, also, to work in harmony with
the officers in question; but they, in turn, were not to use as a
private conveyance the train sent to them, and they were not to alter
its garrison or equipment, or to give orders to the officer in charge
which were contrary to the spirit of the general instructions. The
Assistant-Director was himself required to instruct officers in command
of the trains as to the proper tactics to adopt, the best methods
of patrolling, etc., and to see that they "worked in harmony with
the railway officials, and were an assistance and not a hindrance to
traffic."
These improved conditions led to a recognised system for the employment
of armoured trains, the purposes and duties of which were eventually
defined as follows[44]:--
1. In conjunction with columns in the field, to intercept the enemy whom
the columns were driving on to the line.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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