The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914Pratt, Edwin A.
History
The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914
Pratt, Edwin A.
Railroads; Transportation, Military
[50] "Construction et exploitation des chemins de fer à traction animale
sur le théâtre de la guerre de 1904-5 en Mandchourie." _Revue du Genie
Militaire_, Avril, Mai, Juin, 1909. Paris.
[51] "The Russo-Japanese War. Reports from British Officers attached to
the Japanese and Russians Forces in the Field." Vol. III. General Report
[dated March, 1905] by Col. W. H. H. Waters. London, 1908.
CHAPTER XVIII
STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS: GERMANY
Between "strategical" and "military" railways there are certain
fundamental differences, just as there are, also, between both of them
and ordinary commercial railways.
While designed partly, mainly, or, it may be, exclusively, to serve
military purposes, strategical railways, unlike military railways
proper, form part of the ordinary railway system of the country in which
they are built. They approximate to commercial lines in construction,
equipment and operation, and they are worked in connection with them
for the ordinary purposes of trade and travel; though in their case any
considerations as to whether the traffic they carry is remunerative
does not arise, provided only that they are capable of fulfilling
their real purpose--that, namely, of ensuring such military transports
as may, sooner or later, be required of them. It is possible that in
times of peace the amount of actual traffic passing over them will
be comparatively small, if not even practically _nil_, and that many
years may elapse before the special facilities they must necessarily
offer,--such as extensive siding accommodation and long platforms for
the loading and unloading of troop trains--are likely to be employed to
the fullest extent; but they nevertheless form an integral part both
of the railway system and of the military system of the country, and,
having been constructed, they are, at least, available for military
purposes whenever wanted.
One must, however, again bear in mind that a railway built to meet
the ordinary requirements of trade and travel does not become a
"strategical" any more than a "military" railway simply because, in
time of war, it is used, to whatever extent, for the conveyance of
troops, supplies or war material. The essential factor in each instance
is, not the use that is made of the line, but the particular, or, at
least, the main object it has been built to serve. Just, also, as a
commercial line remains a commercial line notwithstanding its use for
military traffic, so, in turn, a strategical line remains a strategical
line whatever the amount of civilian traffic it may carry in time of
peace.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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