The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914Pratt, Edwin A.
History
The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914
Pratt, Edwin A.
Railroads; Transportation, Military
As against this construction of an elaborate network of strategical
lines towards and along _the Russian frontier_, there must be put the
fact that although, by this means, Germany acquired the power to effect
a great and speedy concentration of troops on the frontier itself, her
locomotives and rolling stock would not be able to cross into Russia and
run on the railways there because of _the difference in gauge_. On the
eastern frontier the question as to how an invasion in large force could
be effected was, consequently, quite different from that which would
present itself on the western frontiers, where the railway gauges of
Belgium, Luxemburg and France were the same as those of Germany.
It was certain that whenever, in the event of war, German troops were
able to enter Russian territory, Russia would withdraw into the interior
or else destroy such of her locomotives and rolling stock as the enemy
might otherwise utilise for his own purpose. If, therefore, the Germans
wanted to use the existing Russian lines, they would either have to
build, in advance, locomotives and rolling stock capable of running
thereon, or they would have to convert the Russian gauge of 5 feet to
the German gauge of 4 feet 8½ inches, so that German trains could run
on the other side of the frontier. As already remarked on page 61, the
reduction of the broader gauge into a narrower one would involve fewer
engineering difficulties than an expansion of the German gauge into the
Russian gauge; yet even the former procedure, if carried out over any
considerable length of line, would take up a good deal of time, and
this would be still more the case if the Russians, when they retreated,
destroyed the railway track and bridges behind them, as they might
confidently be expected to do.
Dependence, again, on the existing lines across the frontier would,
apart from questions of conversion and reconstruction, still give
Germany only a very small number of railway routes into Russia, and
these, also, at points where the opposition offered might be especially
active.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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