Each of such lines of communication would start from some large railway station forming a _Point of Concentration_ ("Etappenanfangsort") for the collection and the dispatch therefrom of supplies for the Army Corps it would serve, or for the receipt and further distribution in the interior of persons or commodities coming back from the seat of war. Along the line of railway, at distances of about 100 or 125 miles, stations were to be selected which would serve as halting-places for the feeding of troops, for the watering of horses, for the reception of sick and wounded unable to continue their journey, for the repair of rolling stock, or for other such purposes. The furthest point to be reached by rail from day to day would constitute _Railhead_ ("Etappenhauptort"), whence communication with the fighting line would be carried on by road, being further facilitated by _Halting Places_ ("Etappenörter") _en route_. The whole of this elaborate organisation--and here we come to the weakest point in the system--was to be under the supreme direction and control of an _Inspector-General of Communications_--a sort of Universal Provider of every requirement the Army could possibly need, and responsible for the fulfilment of a long and exceedingly varied list of obligations among which the conduct of military rail-transport became simply one of many items. The special merit of his position was assumed to be that of a superior authority who, having the rank of Commandant of a Division, and being in constant touch both with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and with the War Minister, would be able to establish harmony in the operations of the different services and corps. The principle itself was sound; but, in practice, such a multiplicity of duties fell upon him, or, through him, on his department, that the break-down which actually occurred in the campaign of 1870-71 should have been foreseen in advance.