declaration of war,[1067] or the banishment of a citizen,[1068] as well as to a universal rule of conduct. In the earlier time the lex rogata, or simply lex, seems to have designated any act of an assembly, elective or judicial as well as law-making in the modern sense.[1069] But in the time of Cicero it had come to mean any act of an assembly which was neither an election nor a judicial decision,[1070] and in the latter sense the word is used in this volume. The acceptance of a proposition by the citizens obligated themselves[1071] but not the government. The king, who retained office for life and was irresponsible, could not be held amenable to law; against a tyrannical ruler the only resource was revolution. Although the republican magistrates possessed remarkably great power, as temporary functionaries they belonged to the people, along with whom they were bound by the laws.[1072] To the end of the regal period the legislative activity of the people remained narrowly restricted. The body of leges regiae, described as curiate by Pomponius[1073] on the supposition that they were passed by the assembly under royal presidency,[1074] was little more than the ius pontificum—the customary religious law—with whose making the curiae had nothing to do.[1075] If the king wished to admit new citizens,[1076] erect public works, levy forced labor on the citizens,[1077] reform the military organization,[1078] punish a man with chains or death,[1079] make a treaty, or even declare an offensive war, no power compelled him to submit the measure to the citizens. Although he must often have found it expedient to engage their coöperation in national enterprises, or more rarely in a legal innovation,[1080] it may be stated with confidence that before the beginning of the republic the curiate assembly had not acquired the right to be consulted on any of these matters—that its slight activity in legislation and administration was a concession from the king rather than a right; for under the republic such activity, gradually increasing, belonged to the centuries and the tribes. We may accept without hesitation the principle that in form if not in substance the curiae retained all the powers which they had ever actually possessed.