or whether the result was reached merely by exclusion and definition. There can be no doubt that the qualifications were identical with those described in the extant lex repetundarum,[2319] attributed by scholars to M’. Acilius Glabrio, a colleague of Gaius, and adopted accordingly soon after the Sempronian judiciary law. The terms of the Acilian statute excluded tribunes of the plebs, quaestors, tresviri capitales, military tribunes of the first four legions, tresviri for assigning lands, persons who had fought in the arena for pay or had been condemned by a quaestio or by the people. It excluded further all under thirty or over sixty years of age, and all who had their domicile more than a mile from Rome, the fathers, brothers, and sons of those who held the offices above enumerated, senators, and their fathers, brothers and sons, as well as persons living beyond the sea. A part of the statute missing from the inscription may have contained a minimal property qualification, which could have been no other than four hundred thousand sesterces; or it may have restricted jury service to those who “possess a public horse.”[2320] According to Plutarch Gaius was allowed the privilege of selecting the jurors. Had he remained in power and continued in this function, he doubtless could have compelled the courts of his choosing to do justice. But the privilege seems to have been restricted to the first list; thereafter, as provided by the lex repetundarum of Acilius the praetor qui inter peregrinos ius dicit was to attend to the matter.[2321] The relation between the Sempronian lex iudiciaria and the lex Acilia repetundarum has not been precisely determined.[2322] If the Sempronian statute preceded the Acilian,[2323] as is not unlikely, it was the intention of Gaius to pass a general law regarding the qualifications and mode of appointment of jurors, to be superseded in large part by a succession of laws, which dealing with individual courts, should regulate the qualification and appointment of their several juries as well as the procedure and the penalties. This policy indicates a conviction that he could give the reformed judicial system greater stability by making the separate laws here referred to entirely independent of his original lex iudiciaria.[2324]