The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
In the early part of 1903 our position became extremely involved.
The interests of the Pri-Amur were by this time pushed completely
into the background; even General Dukhovski, its Governor-General and
Commander-in-Chief, was not consulted upon the most important points
concerning the Far East. Meanwhile, immense enterprises involving many
millions of pounds were being created and controlled on independent
lines in Manchuria, on Chinese territory. The Minister of Finance (M.
de Witte) was building and managing over 1,300 miles of railway. The
alignment of the northern portion was, as I have explained, fixed
in direct opposition to the opinion of General Dukhovski, our chief
authority in those parts, while under the orders of the Finance
Minister an army corps was organized for the protection of the line. So
independent, indeed, was the latter in his conduct of purely military
matters that a pattern of gun for the railway guard was settled, and
the gun purchased abroad without reference to the War Ministry. To
assist in the economic development of the railway, M. de Witte started
a fleet of sea-going merchant ships; for work on the Manchurian
rivers he ran a flotilla of river steamers, some of which were armed.
Vladivostok was no longer considered suitable as a terminus for a
trans-continental trunk line, so, regardless of the fact that the
Kuan-tung district was under the War Department and immediately under
the officer commanding the troops in it (Admiral Alexeieff), Dalny was
selected and created as a great port without reference to either. Huge
sums were spent on this place, which adversely affected the military
importance and strength of Port Arthur, as it was necessary either
to fortify Dalny or be prepared for its seizure and employment by an
enemy as a base of operations against us—a thing which afterwards
happened. I should add that the Russo-Chinese Bank was also in the
Finance Minister’s hands. Finally, M. de Witte maintained his own
representatives in Peking, Seoul, etc. (Pokotiloff in Peking). It so
happened, therefore, that in this year our Minister of Finance was
managing in the Far East railways, a flotilla of merchant steamers,
a certain number of armed vessels, the port of Dalny, and the
Russo-Chinese Bank. He also had under his command an army corps. At the
same time Bezobrazoff and his company were developing their concessions
in Manchuria and Korea, and promoting by every possible means their
timber speculation on the Ya-lu in Northern Korea. One incredible
scheme of Bezobrazoff’s followed another. His idea was to utilize the
Timber Company as a sort of “screen” or barrier against a possible
attack upon us by the Japanese, and during 1902 and 1903 his activity
and that of his adherents assumed a very alarming character. Among
requests that he made of Admiral Alexeieff were to send into Korean
territory 600 soldiers in civilian dress, to organize for service in
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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