The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
“If I were asked to express an opinion, from a military point of
view, upon the comparative importance of Russian interests in
different parts of the Empire, and on different frontiers, I should
put my judgment into the form of a pyramidal diagram, placing the
least important of our interests at the top and the most important
at the bottom, as follows:
Our interests in
Korea.
Our interests in Manchuria.
Military District of the Pri-Amur.
Safe-guarding of this
territory for Russia. Defence
against China and Japan.
Securing the safety of Russia against
Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Great Britain,
and China. Military Districts of the
Caucasus, Turkestan, and Siberia.
Maintenance of domestic peace and order by
the forces of all Military Districts.
Maintenance of the territorial integrity of Russia
against the Powers of the Triple Alliance. The foundation
of Russia’s safety in her western boundary.
“This diagram shows clearly where the principal energies of the
Ministry of War should hereafter be concentrated, and in what
direction in future Russia’s main powers and resources should be
turned. The interests that lie at the foundation of our position
as a nation are: (1) The defence of the territorial integrity of
the Empire against the Powers of the Triple Alliance; and (2) the
employment of the forces of all our military districts for the
preservation of internal peace and order. In comparison with these
tasks all the others have secondary importance. The diagram shows,
furthermore, that our interests in the Pri-Amur region must be
regarded as more important than our interests in Manchuria, and
that the latter must take precedence of our interests in Korea.
I am afraid, however, that, for a time at least, our national
activity will be based on affairs in the Far East, and, if so, the
pyramid will then be turned bottom upwards, and made to stand on
its narrow Korean top. But such a structure on such a foundation
will fall. Columbus solved the problem of making an egg stand on
its end by breaking the egg. Must we, in order to make our pyramid
stand on its narrow Korean end, break the Russian Empire?”
Upon my return from Japan I showed the above diagram to M. de Witte,
who agreed that it was correct. Notwithstanding the disastrous
conclusion to the recent war, we did not adopt Columbus’s method.
Russia is not yet broken; but undoubtedly, now that the war is over,
the above diagram must be considerably altered.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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