The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
Bearing in mind the clearly expressed will of the Emperor that all
necessary measures should be taken to avoid war, and not expecting
favourable results from Alexeieff’s negotiations, I submitted to His
Majesty, on December 6, 1903, a second memorandum on the Manchurian
question, in which I proposed that we should restore Port Arthur
and the province of Kuan-tung to China, and sell the southern branch
of the Eastern Chinese Railway, securing, in lieu thereof, certain
special rights in the northern part of Manchuria. In substance, this
proposition was that we should admit the untimeliness of our attempt to
get an outlet on the Pacific, and abandon it altogether. The sacrifice
might seem a heavy one to make, but I showed the necessity for it
by emphasizing two important considerations. In the first place, by
surrendering Port Arthur (which had been taken away from the Japanese),
and by giving up Southern Manchuria (with the Ya-lu enterprise), we
should escape the danger of a rupture with Japan and China; in the
second place, we should avoid the possibility of internal disturbances
in European Russia. A war with Japan would be extremely unpopular,
and would increase the feeling of dissatisfaction with the ruling
authorities.
At the end of this memorandum occurred the following passage:
“The economic interests of Russia in the Far East are negligible.
We have as yet, thank God, no overproduction in manufactures,
because our domestic markets are not yet glutted. There may be
some export of articles from our factories and foundries, but it
is largely bounty-fed, and will cease—or nearly cease—when such
artificial encouragement is withheld. Russia, therefore, has not
yet arrived at the pitiable necessity of waging war in order to
obtain markets for her products. As for our other interests in that
quarter, the success or failure of a few coal or timber enterprises
in Manchuria and Korea is not a matter of sufficient importance to
justify the risk of war. The railway-lines built through Manchuria
cannot change the situation quickly, and the hope that these lines
will have world-wide importance as arteries of international
commerce is not likely to be soon realized. Travellers, mails, tea
and possibly some other merchandise will go over them, but the
great masses of heavy international freight, which alone can give
such importance to a railway, must still go by sea, on account of
the heavy railway rates. Such is not the case, however, with local
freight to supply local needs. This the railroad—and especially the
southern branch—will carry in increasing amount, thus deriving most
of its revenue, and, at the same time, stimulating the growth of
the country, and, in Southern Manchuria particularly, benefiting
the Chinese population. But if we do not take special measures
to direct even local freight to Dalny, that port is likely to
suffer from the competition of Newchuang. Port Arthur has no value
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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