The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
“We are now passing through a critical period. Internal enemies,
aiming at the destruction of the dearest and most sacred
foundations of life, are invading even the ranks of our army.
Large groups of the population have become dissatisfied, or
mentally unsettled, and disorders of various sorts—mostly created
by revolutionary propaganda—are increasing in frequency. Cases in
which troops have to be called out to deal with such disorders
are much more common than they were even a short time ago. Secret
revolutionary publications directed against the Government are
being more frequently found, even in the barracks.... We must hope,
however, that this evil has not yet taken deep root in Russian
soil, and that by strict and wise measures it may be eradicated.
If Russia were attacked from without, the people, with patriotic
fervour, would undoubtedly repudiate the false teaching of the
revolutionary propaganda, and show themselves as ready to answer
the call of their revered monarch, and to defend their Tsar and
country, as they were in the early years of the eighteenth and
particularly in the nineteenth century. If, however, they are
asked to make great sacrifices in order to carry on a war whose
objects are not clearly understood by them, the leaders of the
anti-Government party will take advantage of the opportunity to
spread sedition. Thus there will be introduced a new factor which,
if we decide on war in the Far East, we must take into account.
The sacrifices and dangers that we have experienced, or that we
anticipate, as results of the position we have taken in the Far
East, ought to be a warning to us when we dream of getting an
outlet on the warm waters of the Indian Ocean at Chahbar.[65] It is
already evident that the British are preparing to meet us there.
The building of a railroad across Persia, the construction of a
defended port and the maintenance of a fleet, etc., will simply be
a repetition of our experience with the Eastern Chinese Railway and
Port Arthur. In the place of Port Arthur we shall have Chahbar, and
instead of war with Japan, we shall have a still more unnecessary
and still more terrible war with Great Britain.
“In view of the considerations above set forth, the questions
arise: Ought we not to avoid the present danger at Port Arthur,
as well as the future danger in Persia? Ought we not to restore
Kuan-tung, Port Arthur, and Dalny to China, give up the southern
branch of the Eastern Chinese Railway, and get from China, in
place of it, certain rights in Northern Manchuria and a sum of,
say, £25,000,000 as compensation for expenses incurred by us in
connection with the railway and Port Arthur?”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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