The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
2. _The Expedition to China in 1900._—At first, a force of three
battalions, one squadron, and one company of sappers—total 3,000 men—of
the 5th and 11th Divisions was mobilized in July, followed about
a month later by the mobilization of the 5th Division. The troops
were conveyed to Ta-ku in twenty-one transports, chartered from the
Nippon-Yusen-Kaisha.[67] Excluding the first force, 19,000 men in all
were taken (the whole of the 5th Division, the Zopoleff batteries,
part of the railway battalion from Tokio, and 6,000 to 7,000 hired
coolies wearing uniform). Altogether, 22,000 men were transported—the
5th Division with its units and coolies—and all the supplies were sent
from Japan. During the whole time, about 6,000 sick and wounded were
returned to the base, while one-half of the cavalry and artillery
and three-quarters of the transport horses died. The cost of the
expedition, estimated at £3,800,000 to £4,000,000, was taken from the
fund of some £5,000,000 set aside for the construction of warships and
emergency expenditure. Within seven years of the war of 1894–95 Japan
had almost doubled her armed forces, and was very largely enabled to do
this by the war indemnity received from China, the payment of which was
made through our mediation.
The strength of the Japanese army, before the war with us, was
calculated by our Headquarter Staff to be as follows:
The peace strength of the standing army (excluding the garrison of
Formosa) was estimated at 8,116 officers and 133,457 men. For economy,
however, only 6,822 officers and 110,000 men were actually with the
colours in peace, and of these, about 13,500 were continually on
furlough. The war strength was fixed at 10,735 officers (without
depôt troops) and 348,074 men. Thus, to bring the peace numbers
up to the war establishment, about 3,900 officers and 240,000 more
men were required. On January 1, 1901, there were in the standing
army, reserve, and territorial forces a total of 2,098 staff and
general officers, 8,755 regimental and warrant officers, 35,248
non-commissioned officers, 6,964 second-lieutenants and _yunkers_, and
273,476 men, a total of 10,853 officers and 315,688 men.[68] Taking
the peace establishment of the standing army at 8,116 officers and
about 110,000 men, it is evident that on January 1, 1901, there were
2,737 officers and about 205,000 men in the reserve and territorial
forces. Comparing these numbers with those required to bring the peace
establishment up to war strength, we find that on January 1, 1901,
the numbers could not have been obtained; that there was a shortage
of officers equal to those required for the reserve troops,[69] and a
shortage of some 35,000 men. Taking into consideration the probable
yearly contingent of recruits (45,000 men), and also the periods of
service in the different classes of troops, it may be said that by
January 1, 1903, the number of men in the reserve and territorial
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