The readiness of their army for mobilization, owing to their adoption of a territorial system, and the consequent short distances the depôt troops had to travel, was known to be very complete. We knew that the troops could complete their mobilization in three or four days, while the supply and other departments would require seven to ten. Information as to transports available showed that even in 1902 they could have collected in seven days 86 ships with an aggregate displacement of 224,000 tons, and in fourteen days 97 ships with a displacement of 268,000. For a mobilized division about 40,000 tons are required for a journey of more than forty-eight hours, while 20,000 tons would suffice for a journey of less than forty-eight hours. Thus the tonnage available was sufficient to allow embarkation to be commenced at once on completion of mobilization of six divisions for a journey of not more than forty-eight hours, or of almost the whole army for a lesser distance. As regards the tactical readiness of the Japanese before the war, our people in Manchuria did receive certain information. The operations of large bodies of their troops of all arms had been commented upon by our Headquarter Staff as follows: “The most noticeable points in the operations of bodies consisting of all three arms as seen at the manœuvres were— “1. The inclination to take up too extended defensive positions. “2. A hard-and-fast, inelastic form of attack independent of local conditions. “3. The absence of proper flank protection both on the march and in action. “4. The tendency, when on the move, to keep the main body too far from the advance guard, which would in consequence have to fight unsupported for a long time. “5. The absence of a definite objective in the attack. “6. The tendency to use up reserves too quickly. As a result, there are frequently no troops with which to meet turning and enveloping movements. “7. The disbelief in cold steel. “8. The inclination to avoid enclosed and, in particular, hilly ground. “9. The inclination to use direct frontal attacks without turning movements. “10. The neglect of field fortifications in the defence; infantry fire trenches, gun-pits and epaulements alone are made. “11. The complete absence of any idea of pursuit. “12. The tendency to retire too rapidly: the infantry of the main body withdraws first; this is followed by the whole of the guns, and then the remaining infantry. “13. The disinclination for night operations. “14. The absence of contact between divisions: each division operates independently without keeping in touch with others; this is due to the lack of general control by the officer in chief command.