The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
“In the future, every month will increase the necessity of
strengthening the line still more. When the field army was small,
we drew our supplies almost entirely from local sources (wheat,
barley, hay, straw, fuel, and cattle), but these will soon be
exhausted, and the provisioning the army will depend on supplies
from Europe. When we move forward our position will become worse,
for we shall be moving into a part of Manchuria already devastated
by war, and into a hilly tract which was never rich in supplies.
The daily transport of provisions (flour, groats, oats, hay,
and meat) for our present establishment takes up 5 trains, and
we soon shall have to provide carriage for live-stock. But the
army cannot live from hand to mouth. A quantity of supplies must
be collected, sufficient to form a reserve for the force for
some months, besides satisfying current requirements, and this
must be distributed in the advance and main depôts. It will take
5 additional trains a day for one month to collect one month’s
reserve. Only by having a large number of trains can we organize
our advance depôts with necessary rapidity, and move them to fresh
points. The demand for trains is greatest on those days when
fighting is in progress. A number of urgent demands—amounting
sometimes to hundreds during two or three days—are made, not
only for supplies, but for the carriage of military and engineer
stores, troops, parks, and the transport of drafts and of wounded.
The needs of an army in war are so varied and so vast that it
is considered necessary in Europe to have for each army corps a
special line of rails (single track), capable of running 14 to
20 pairs of trains in the 24 hours. For our 9 army corps we have
only one single line of rails running (in the last few weeks) from
8 to 10 pairs of trains. The inability of the line to cope with
the necessities of the war is the main reason for the slow and
indecisive nature of the campaign. Our reinforcements arrive in
driblets. Supplies despatched from Russia in the spring are still
on the Siberian line. Waterproofs sent for the summer will arrive
when we want fur coats; fur coats will be received when waterproofs
are wanted. But so far, during all these months that we have been
in contact with the enemy, have fought and have retired, we have
not been hungry, because we have been living on the country. The
situation is now altogether changed, for local resources will last
only for a short time longer. Our horses will soon have to be fed
on hay and straw, and if we do not make extraordinary efforts to
improve the railway and concentrate a large quantity of supplies at
the advanced base, our men, who are concentrated in great numbers
on small areas, will, after the horses, begin to suffer hardship
and hunger, and will fall sick. Any accidental damage to the
railway will be sorely felt.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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