The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
not occur to the Headquarter Staff to make use of these men for the
army in the field, though there were more than 200,000 of them—young
soldiers, splendidly trained—who might have been enrolled in reserve
units and then sent as drafts to the front. In this matter Headquarters
were guided by considerations quite unconnected with the war. The
advisability of retaining in their regular units the men about to pass
to the reserve was indeed considered, but it was put down as having
many disadvantages. The political side of the matter was what carried
most weight at Headquarters; moreover, questions of finance were
involved, for the men so retained with the colours would, upon arrival
of the recruits, have been supernumerary to the establishment. But,
owing to the shortage caused by the formation of new corps, it was
found difficult to carry out guard and other duties, and in some units
the men due to leave were retained with the colours till the young
soldiers had joined the ranks. General officers in command of districts
gave various replies when asked for their opinions on this matter; some
were for retaining the men, others for letting them go. In the summer
of 1904 the War Minister asked the Tsar’s permission to authorize
commanding officers to pass men of the infantry, field artillery, and
engineers into the reserve if they thought fit, provided that men were
not kept with the colours longer than March 31, 1905. The transfer in
other arms of the Service was to be as usual. Thus the retention in the
ranks of these time-expired soldiers was the exception, and was not
dependent on the war. Always fearful of a European war, we replaced the
troops sent from Russia to the front by forming a large number of new
divisions from the reservists. This course was also necessary for the
maintenance of internal order. On August 23, 1904, officers commanding
districts were authorized to transfer men retained with the colours
into the newly formed infantry and artillery units, and thus to get
rid of the same number of 2nd Category reservists. Thus the reserve
divisions formed for service in the interior of Russia began to be
filled by good men and rid of 2nd Category men before the divisions
at the front were. In the autumn of 1904, at the request of the
authorities in the field, authority was given to transfer men retained
with the colours up to March 31, 1905, into the units mobilized and
expanded by the seven partial mobilizations, and to discharge from
these units the 2nd Category reservists and men of large families.
It was only on December 27, 1904, when the young soldiers joined the
ranks, that arrangements were made to transfer the men retained with
the colours into the units that were not mobilized or expanded. These
men were available for despatch to the front as drafts in the summer
and autumn of 1904, but they only arrived a year later, after the
Mukden battles, when they were too late. These splendid men saw no
fighting at all.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account