The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
The shortage of officers was also a bad feature of our arrangements.
In spite of the stream sent out to replace casualties, many units went
short of their proper complement of officers all through the war.
Both the troops actually in the Far East and the reinforcements sent
out were at their peace strength when hostilities commenced. Indeed,
there were instances in the beginning of the war of companies going
into action for the first time commanded by junior lieutenants. As
things went on, this deficiency in leaders was found to exist even in
those units whose muster rolls showed an excess above their proper
complement, and after the first fights, owing to the specially heavy
casualties among the officers, cases were quite common of battalions
and companies in action which were commanded by captains and second
lieutenants. This dearth at the front was increased by the number of
officers absorbed in departmental and other duties in the rear, and, in
the case of the reinforcements, by so many—both medical and combatant
officers—being left at the different bases; the latter were, of course,
intended, in case of a general mobilization, to be available for
general or regimental duties with the newly formed units. These remarks
apply more particularly to the infantry. In the cavalry and artillery
the numbers, though less than the establishment, were generally
sufficient to carry on with. This was due to the fewer casualties in
those arms. There is no doubt that the question of providing officers
for an army in the field is a very serious one, which is complicated by
many extraneous circumstances. We found that when the period of great
battles and consequent heavy losses amongst the officers commenced,
the discrepancy between the number of them shown on paper and of those
actually present with a regiment rapidly increased. The names of a
large number of wounded and sick were kept on the rolls for a long
time. Some of the wounded and sick who stayed in the theatre of war
gradually drifted back to their regiments, but the great number who had
gone to Russia remained there, and did not rejoin even after they had
quite recovered. There were instances where commanders of regiments,
who had gone to Russia convalescent and had not returned, were still
shown as commanding, and were still drawing command pay. Several who
went home sick or wounded loafed about the streets of our cities or
large towns for months, and the curious thing is that no one seemed to
question such behaviour. In spite of what was done to obviate this, the
medical officers and the medical board were far too lenient to those
who wished to return home, and gave them every facility. On the other
hand, many who were considered incompetent for field service, and sent
back to Russia on this account, appeared again as fit, and returned
to their corps, thus squeezing out from the command of companies and
battalions those who had honourably borne all the hardships of the
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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