The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
When I was War Minister I had directed General Narbut, a member of the
Military Council, to work out a scheme whereby a reserve of officers
might be obtained in war. The essence of this scheme was that our cadet
schools should, on mobilization, pass out a larger number of cadets
as officers, and should then set to work to train as soon as possible
those officers of the 1st and 2nd Categories who volunteered, and also
the men of the regulars who were possessed of an intermediate standard
of education, thousands of whom were good enough to be given the rank
and duties of lieutenant. Why this scheme was not carried out during
the war I do not know, but unless steps are taken to do something
of this kind in future we shall be in difficulties. We did not take
advantage of the possibility when war was declared, or even immediately
afterwards, of passing out a greater number of the senior classes of
the military and cadet schools. In 1902 these colleges supplied the
army with 2,642 officers; we might, therefore, have received at the
beginning of 1904 and 1905 more than 5,000 young officers wherewith to
fill vacancies in the field. This is precisely what the Japanese did.
Foreseeing how we should be placed, on March 19, 1904, I asked the War
Minister that officers might be commissioned from the military and
_yunker_ schools, before the manœuvres, at the rate of 2 per battalion,
1 per battery, 4 per Cossack regiment, and 100 to the reserve. This was
not done. On my repeated representations as to the urgent necessity for
increasing the supply, I received in 1904 a curt reply to the effect
that the maintenance of the number of officers up to establishment
was the duty of the War Minister, not that of the officer commanding
the army in the field. When the output was eventually increased, we
received only a comparatively small number of those who had just got
their commissions. These formed a most desirable element in the army,
and in the majority of cases behaved splendidly in action.
On the whole, our troops were, for the reasons explained, very short of
officers in the greater number of actions. Although the War Department
accomplished a great work in sending out the large number of officers
that did go to the front, very little discrimination was shown in their
selection. It must be acknowledged, also, that we made little use
either of our non-commissioned officers in the way of preparing them to
take the places of officers, or of the splendid material to our hand in
the cadets of the military and cadet schools.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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