In the _Russki Invalid_ (No. 143 of 1895) an article appeared in reply to one by Demchinski, which had been published in the _Slovo_ under the title of “Were we Ready for War?” Demchinski endeavoured to prove that we spend more than other countries on national defence; that the amounts allotted for this purpose in Russia are ample; that the measures brought forward as necessary in order to prepare our army for war are merely a cloak for extortion; and that lack of financial control in our administration allows great openings for the misappropriation of funds. In replying, the article in the _Russki Invalid_ quoted from the standard works of Professor Maksheeff upon the army estimates of Germany and Russia from 1888 to 1900. During these thirteen years the expenditure amounted to £358,100,000 in Germany, and £347,900,000 in Russia. Therefore Germany, with half our peace strength, spent in that period £10,000,000 more than we did. The enormous length of our frontiers, amongst other things, forces us to maintain twice as many men in peace as Germany. Even of the lesser sum for greater numbers that we spend, we are obliged to allot almost the whole to meet maintenance charges (food, uniform, etc.). So that not only do we spend less money than Germany on the whole, but we can afford proportionately less on “special or extraordinary services,” which include those of preparing the army for war. On this important question the writer of the article in the _Russki Invalid_ expresses himself much to the point: “As the ordinary expenditure is urgent, and cannot be postponed, it calls for no comment, being allotted, in fact, to measures to which we are already committed. With regard to the measures which come under the head of extraordinary expenditure, the case is different. They are not urgent in the sense that we are absolutely committed to them, and they are, therefore, as a matter of course, not urgent in the opinion of those unversed in military matters. Consequently these persons are inclined to refuse sanction to such measures, to postpone them, or, under the most favourable circumstances, to spread their execution over a considerable period. The result is bad for national defence and for the preparation of the army for war. Our forces might suddenly be called upon to take the field with inferior armament, with insufficient and unserviceable supplies, and without well-organized communications. Upon analyzing the German army estimates, one is struck with the comparative magnitude of the initial and extraordinary expenditure, which shows that, although her army is half the strength of ours, she spends vastly more money on it than we do on ours.”