The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
The armament, also, could not well have been provided more quickly. The
ordnance had first to be made, and the orders for coast guns could only
be executed slowly, as the Obukhoff factory was full of work for the
Navy Department. The 10-inch and 11-inch Canet guns and large-calibre
mortars ordered by the War Department were required simultaneously in
all the Russian naval fortresses, especially in Libau, Kronstadt, and
Vladivostok; but, as a matter of fact, Port Arthur and Vladivostok
received most of them at the expense of our strength in the Baltic
and Black Seas. While awaiting the demands for new ordnance to be
complied with, we robbed other places, so as to bring up the Port
Arthur armament to some hundreds of guns. In the first years of its
occupation, also, everything for this place had to be sent round by
sea. Notwithstanding all these difficulties, in four years (1899 to
1903) we succeeded in making Port Arthur so strong that the armament of
its sea-front kept the whole Japanese fleet at a respectful distance,
while the batteries on the land side withstood a severe test under the
most unfavourable conditions. Not only were the enemy numerous and
possessed of technical troops and material for the destruction of our
defences, but being presented with a ready-made base in Dalny, they
were able to land monster siege-guns. Once again, as at Sevastopol,
our fleet was more useful on land than on its proper element. Yet the
enemy lost twice as many men as the garrison, and Port Arthur held out
almost twelve months from the commencement of the war. Even then its
fall was premature.
Much attention was also paid to economy, and Treasury interests were
by no means overlooked. The rapid concentration of troops, the large
number of buildings that had to be constructed and the collection of
supplies and stores for the commissariat and engineer departments,
afforded ample scope for malpractices; but the appointment of selected
officers at the head of these two great branches of the army, and
of picked men as their assistants, was naturally productive of good
results, and the reputation of these branches in no way suffered in the
war.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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