The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
Immense sums were spent on the
creation of the town of Dalny, on the Eastern Chinese Railway and its
palatial offices in Harbin, and on the services connected with it.
For this latter enterprise, which was both a commercial and State
proposition (private as regards management, and official as regards
the supply of funds), the money was mostly obtained from the so-called
“surpluses.” These “surpluses” expanded in a manner unprecedented in
the financial records, not only of our own country, but probably of
the world, and in our case much to the detriment of the most pressing
needs of all departments. The idea underlying the creation of a
surplus was simplicity itself. While all demands for money made by
the different departments were cut down, the estimated receipts from
revenue were also reduced. The results were amazing. The excess of
receipts over expenditure at a time when the most pressing requirements
for national defence could not be met for lack of funds amounted in
some years to over £20,000,000. The following table gives the “errors”
in estimating made by the Finance Minister in calculating the revenue
between 1894–1905:
+-----+-----------------------+-----------+
| | The Revenue. | Actual |
| +-----------+-----------+Excess over|
| | Estimated.| Actual. | Estimate. |
| +-----------+-----------+-----------+
| | £ | £ | £ |
|1894 |100,482,327|115,378,581| 14,896,253|
|1895 |114,295,700|125,581,878| 11,286,177|
|1896 |123,947,169|136,871,935| 12,924,765|
|1897 |131,836,649|141,638,609| 9,801,960|
|1898 |136,445,821|158,485,444| 22,039,622|
|1899 |146,912,820|167,331,306| 20,418,485|
|1900 |159,374,568|170,412,850| 11,038,282|
|1901 |173,009,600|179,945,715| 6,936,114|
|1902 |180,078,448|190,540,444| 10,461,995|
|1903 |189,703,267|203,180,081| 13,476,813|
|1904 |198,009,449|201,826,131| 3,816,682|
|1905 |197,704,561|202,443,193| 4,738,631|
+-----+-----------+-----------+-----------+
This shows—
(_a_) That the difference between the estimated and actual receipts
amounted in 1898 and 1899 to more than £20,000,000 _per annum_.
(_b_) That in eight years out of twelve the actual income exceeded the
estimates by £10,000,000 _per annum_.
(_c_) That the revenue was little affected by the war, and that for
1904 and 1905 the excess of income over estimates was more than
£8,000,000. Had the calculations as to receipts, therefore, been
more accurate, it would have been quite possible to grant to the War
Ministry the supplementary sum asked for, and thus to enable our
preparations to have been more complete in east and west.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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