The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
“By means of reconnaissances and the employment of spies,
we gradually sifted our inaccurate intelligence till our
information was correct. We were able first to locate the
disposition of the enemy’s armies, then of his divisions, and,
finally, of small units.
“The services to the rear were carried out with similar energy;
roads were laid out, the Sungari was bridged, and storehouses
were built.
“At the beginning of July the army was almost ready to advance;
the only thing lacking was the equipment for light railways for
horse traction. Without this it was impossible to advance in
any great strength.
“During the last few months a horse railway was laid to
Ya-mu-tzu, and the carriage of supplies for a forward movement
was thus assured.
“A connected series of reconnaissances were carried out in
order to gain knowledge of the ground in front.
“The army was brought almost up to full strength by the drafts
and new units which had joined.
“In August it was quite ready for battle, and its now
recuperated and reinforced veteran corps waited the order for a
forward movement in complete confidence.”
General Bilderling, who commanded the 2nd Manchurian Army (which
suffered the most heavily at Mukden), finishes his report on this army
as follows:
“The army occupied the Hsi-ping-kai position, shattered and
disorganized by the battle of Mukden; but it has recovered with
extraordinary rapidity. With the arrival of the young soldiers
and reservists, all the units have been brought up to full war
strength, and it is only in the officers that there is still
a great deficiency. The mounted units have been reinforced by
fresh squadrons and by horses from the artillery reserve; the
guns and waggons which were lost or had become unserviceable
have been replaced. Every division has been strengthened by
mounted and dismounted machine-gun sections, and howitzer
batteries have been formed; a light railway for horse-draught
has been laid along the whole length of the position and in
rear of it; and, profiting by recent experience, the troops are
now thoroughly proficient in all exercises and manœuvres. Thus
the army, by reason of its numbers, material composition, and
training, has become really better prepared for hostilities at
the close of the war than it was at the beginning, and again
constitutes a menace to the enemy.”
The 3rd Manchurian Army, which, under the command of General Batianoff,
formed a reserve for the 1st and 2nd Armies, and contained corps which
had arrived latest and had not been in action, was also a large and
reliable body of men.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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