The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
In future we shall only be able to rely to a small extent upon the
vast supplies of food in Manchuria, and shall be obliged to convey
the greater portion not only of our munitions of war, but of our
food-supplies, from European Russia and Siberia. It will therefore be
necessary to make use of our water communications, for the failure of
the attempt to transport supplies in 1905 by the Arctic Ocean and the
River Yenissei cannot be considered final. Particular assistance also
could be afforded to the army by increasing the population of Siberia,
and so at the same time augmenting the local resources necessary for an
army. The rich reserves of metals, coals, and timber in that part will
assist us in bringing nearer to the Far East not only our food-supply
base, but also our war base (for ordnance, ammunition, explosives,
etc.).
Among the main reasons for our disasters must be mentioned the
indifferent, even hostile attitude of the people to the late war; but
the menace to our nation from the Far East is now so clear that all
grades of society ought to prepare—in case of a fresh attack on Russia
by Japan or China—to rise like one man to defend the integrity and the
greatness of our Fatherland.
Thus, to attain success in any such future war, which is by no means an
improbable contingency, we should strive—
1. To be in a position to make use of all our troops;
2. To have thorough railway communication between the Pri-Amur and
Russia;
3. To prepare the waterways of Siberia for the carriage of heavy goods
in bulk from west to east;
4. To move the army’s base as far as possible from Russia into Siberia;
and, what is most important—
5. To make ready to carry on a new war not only with the army, but with
the whole of a patriotic nation.
History had apparently destined Russia to undergo a bitter trial from
1904 to 1906, both on the field of battle and at home. Our great nation
has issued renewed and strengthened from still heavier trials, and let
us not doubt now but that Russia, summoned by the Tsar to a new life,
will quickly recover from the temporary blows which she has sustained,
and will not fall from her high place among the other nations of the
world. As regards the army, its bitter experiences should not on this
occasion fail to bear fruit, and the most detailed, thorough, and
fearless study of all its defects can only bring about a renewal and
increase of strength. We must remember one point—and it is the main
point: our officers and many of the men conducted themselves most
unselfishly in most difficult circumstances. Given this, all our other
faults can be comparatively quickly mended; but before all else, we
must not be afraid of openly acknowledging them.
Strength lies—in the truth.
In this important work of rejuvenation which is now beginning in Russia
for the good of the people and the army, we must remember the great
words of the Tsar to the Army and Fleet almost two years ago:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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