The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
This danger being temporarily averted, I ordered the 31st Infantry
Division back to Hai-cheng. As the defence of Liao-yang from the east
was the next most urgent matter, a brigade of the 9th Division, which
had just arrived from Russia, was moved to Lang-tzu-shan to act as
a reserve to the eastern force, which had been previously augmented
by the return to it of two regiments of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle
Division. The other brigade was sent, under General Hershelman, who
commanded the division, to Hsi-kei-an village [at the junction of the
Liao-yang and Mukden roads], so as to cover the left flank of the
eastern force and guard the road to Mukden. Taking into consideration
the considerable increase of the eastern force, I ordered Count Keller
to take the offensive, so as again to get possession of the passes.
He did so, but although he had forty battalions under his command,
he advanced with only twenty-four. Though our troops were successful
in the early hours of July 17, thanks to the gallant conduct of the
24th East Siberian Rifles under Colonel Lechitski, the result of the
day’s action was not favourable. Keller stopped the advance before
even bringing into action his strong reserves, with the result that at
nightfall the eastern force was once more on its former positions on
the Yang-tzu Ling (Pass). On the 19th the brigade of the 9th Division
was driven from its position at Chiao-tou, and fell back towards
Hu-chia-tzu.[69]
By the middle of July the disposition of the enemy’s forces was
approximately as follows: Kuroki, with three field divisions and
reserves, had captured the three Fen-shui Ling and Mo-Tien Ling
(Passes), and, with his outposts thrown out on the roads to Liao-yang,
had reached the valley of the Tang Ho, a tributary of the Tai-tzu Ho.
Nodzu, with an army of approximately the same strength, had captured
the passes on the Kai-ping, Ta-shih-chiao, and Hai-cheng roads, and
had two divisions and a brigade in reserve on the Hai-cheng line of
advance and one on the Ta-shih-chiao line. Oku, having moved up from
Kuan-tung with his army of some four divisions, had driven back our
outposts and occupied Kai-ping. Two brigades were left in reserve on
the line Feng-huang-cheng—Kuan-tien-chang. Thus, according to our
information, two armies of about 90 to 100 battalions had advanced
against us from the east, and one of about 50 to 60 battalions from
the south, whilst Nogi’s army of 3 divisions and 2 reserve brigades
had been left to operate against Port Arthur. Our dispositions were
briefly: 44 battalions against Kuroki’s army; 28 battalions on the
line Fen-shui-ling—Hai-cheng against 2 divisions and 1 reserve brigade
of Nodzu’s army; 48 battalions against Oku’s army, and 1 division of
Nodzu’s; 16 battalions were in the general reserve at Hai-cheng, and
four in garrison at Liao-yang. It must, however, be borne in mind that
the effective strength of our battalions was very far short of the
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account