Adhering to the original plan of offensive operations decided upon in accordance with the opinions of all the army commanders, I requested Kaulbars to fix the first day for the advance. He first chose February 23, but owing to the troops of the 2nd Army being worn out with the very heavy work they had done in connection with the fortification of the positions, the advance was, at his own request, postponed till the 25th. On the 24th, however, Kaulbars heard that the date for the assault of San-de-pu was known to the enemy. He therefore lost hope of success, and asked that the assault might be indefinitely postponed. Meanwhile, on the 23rd, the enemy advanced in force against the Ching-ho-cheng column, and this body fell back from its fortified position next day after fighting an unsuccessful engagement. At the commencement of the Japanese advance our armies were distributed as follows: _Right Flank._—2nd Army, consisting of the 1st Siberians, Composite Rifle, 8th and 10th Corps, a brigade of the 3rd and a mixed brigade of the 5th Siberians (total, 126 battalions), occupying the line Ssu-fang-tai–Chang-tan–Hou-lien-tai, a length of sixteen miles. _Centre._—3rd Army, consisting of the 5th Siberians (less two regiments), 17th Corps, and one division of the 6th Siberians (total, 72 battalions), occupying the line Hou-lien-tai–Ling- shen-pu–Sha-ho-pu–Shan-lan-tzu, a length of eleven miles. _Left Flank._—Here were the 1st Army (less one regiment), 4th, 2nd, and 3rd Siberians (the latter less one brigade), 71st Division, Independent Siberian Reserve Brigade, and two Trans-Baikal infantry battalions (total, 128 battalions), occupying the line Shan-lan-tzu–Lu-chiang-tun–Erh-ta-kou–Lia-cheng-wu-tun, and further along the right bank of the Sha Ho, having its left flank three miles east of the Kao-tai Ling (Pass), a length of thirty miles. The 1st Army also had independent columns at Ching-ho-cheng and Hsin-tsin-tin. _The General Reserve_ consisted of forty-four battalions—namely, the 16th Corps (less one brigade) on the railway six miles south of Mukden station, 72nd Division, and 146th Tsaritsin Regiment, behind the right flank of the 1st Army at Huang-shan. On February 23 the shortage in the infantry (rank and file) of all three armies was 49,000. A “Short Account of the Operations round Mukden in February, 1905,” was submitted to His Majesty the Tsar with a letter from me dated May 13, 1905. A detailed description of these operations has been completed, and has now also been submitted to His Majesty. The whole of the Mukden operations can be divided into three phases: 1. From February 23 to 28, till the turning movement against our right flank developed. 2. From February 28 to March 9—the period of our concentration on the right bank of the Hun Ho, and our attempts to drive back the enemy who were enveloping us. 3. From March 9 to 16—our final attempt to hold on to Mukden, and our forced abandonment of it.