Owing to the appearance of large hostile bodies near Ka-liao-ma, I had on February 28 already ordered him[95] to take immediate steps to ascertain their exact strength, the direction in which they were moving, and their intentions. I repeated this order[96] on March 2, instructing him to find out their strength and dispositions more accurately if possible, and to frame some plan of action. I pointed out the necessity for energetic steps to ascertain the whereabouts of Nogi’s main body—whether it was opposite Sha-ling-pu, or whether it was executing a wider turning movement. On the morning of March 5 I for the third time[97] asked Kaulbars to find out where Nogi’s left flank was. Not one of these orders was carried out, with the result that I had inadequate and incorrect information upon which to form a decision as to the strength and whereabouts of the enemy operating on the right bank of the Hun. Tserpitski’s alarmist reports to the effect that more than three divisions were opposed to him made the fog worse. Kaulbars, who had been ordered to stop Nogi’s flanking movement, on the strength of incorrect information, all the time turned his chief attention towards the western front to Oku, whom he took for Nogi. The latter, owing to the 2nd Army’s inaction on March 3, 4, 5 and 6, was made a present of four days in which to complete his sweeping movement to the north-east,[98] and Kaulbars continued to see danger only on the west, paying insufficient attention to what was happening on the Hsin-min-tun road, north-west of Mukden. On March 1 he conceived a most complicated “castling” manœuvre, which he endeavoured to carry out when in direct touch with the enemy. The Composite Rifle Corps was ordered to cross from the right bank of the Hun on to the left, and the 8th Corps from the left to the right. The Rifle regiments crossed over the river, and by so doing evacuated the most important section near Chang-tan, but the 8th Corps was unable to get across. The enemy at once took advantage of this, and, rapidly throwing their 8th Division forward along the right bank of the river, drove back the relatively weak force of ours still on that side. Kaulbars, moreover, stopped the movement on Sha-ling-pu (of the Composite Division under Golembatovski), which had already been started, and by so doing deprived us of the possibility of checking the heads of the enemy’s columns on March 2. Finally, the 5th Rifle Brigade under Churin—which was moving by my orders to operate against Nogi—was stopped on March 3 by Kaulbars in the valley on the right bank of the Hun, and found itself among the troops opposing Oku.