Moreover, sixteen battalions of the 10th Corps (2nd Army) were by my orders concentrated opposite Sha-ling-pu on the 2nd, and on the 7th the 10th Rifle Regiment and two battalions of the 4th Siberians were sent from my reserve to join Kaulbars’ army—_i.e._, he was given in all eighty-one battalions, of which sixty-five had not previously belonged to the 2nd Army. Of these, as transpired later, as many as thirty-five battalions did not take part, or only took very little part, in any fighting up to the 10th—_i.e._: Battalions. 1st Siberians 13 De Witte’s column 13 2nd Brigade, 9th Division 8 10th Rifle Brigade 2 ―― Total 35 These units either occupied defensive positions, and merely watched the Japanese making a flank march past them,[101] or were moved for no reason from one place to another (2nd Brigade of the 9th Division). Their losses from the 3rd to 9th were trifling. On the 4th, when I ordered Kaulbars to “move every available man on to the right flank near the Hsin-min-tun road,” the reverse was done. Two regiments (Tambov and Zamost) were moved from the right bank of the river on to the left; the 2nd Brigade of the 9th Division was ordered to move away from the Hsin-min-tun road, and crossed from Huang-ku-tun to Liu-kou-tun, and the Primorsk Dragoons from an important position on this road were sent to the rear to Hu-shih-tai.[102] On March 5 we were able to collect more than 100 battalions for operations against Nogi, 70 being concentrated by my instructions. But although Kaulbars had received orders to send an army corps on to the right bank of the Hun to engage Nogi, he not only did not carry out the order, but lost five days (March 2 to 6), and thus allowed the turning movement to develop so far that part of the force I had collected (25th Division) was on the 7th operating, not against Nogi, but against Oku’s left flank. Moreover, as he had on the 5th also weakened the force collected by me to act against Nogi by sending 16 battalions to the left flank of the 2nd Army, the result of these dispositions and our inaction during these five days was that on the 7th only 37 battalions operated against Nogi instead of 100. The loss of time, and the weakness of the force that actually opposed Nogi, were largely contributory to our failure.