The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
On the 6th and 7th I made a final attempt to wrest victory from the
Japanese. Hoping that Kuroki had suffered heavily on the preceding
days, and relying on the splendid material in the 1st Army, I made
up my mind, after considerable discussion of the matter with its
commander on the telephone, to weaken that army considerably, so as to
make certain of having sufficient men at Tsu-erh-tun. I augmented my
main reserve by the whole of the 72nd Division, a brigade of the 2nd
Siberian, and eighteen battalions from the 1st Army and 4th Siberian
Corps. The commander of the 1st Army was of opinion that if we did not
soon have a success on the right this weakening of the 1st Army might
be a danger, but though fully realizing the force of his contention, I
considered it necessary to take the risk for the following reasons:
1. One hundred and five splendid battalions were still left under the
command of General Linievitch.
2. The enemy in front of the 1st Army must, according to the reports
sent in by its commander, have lost very heavily.
3. The Japanese had transferred almost the whole of Oku’s army to
the right bank of the Hun Ho, immediately after Nogi’s, and we had
either to break through this disposition or strengthen those of our
forces on the right bank of the Hun Ho by a lateral movement. As I
have described already (Vol. III.), our hopes were not realized. The
movement of the reserves to Tsu-erh-tun was effected very much more
slowly than we had counted upon, and, taking advantage of our reduction
in strength on the front held by the 1st Army, the enemy broke through
there. At the point of our position (Chiu-tien) where the enemy broke
through, _there should have been, according to the arrangements of the
officer commanding the 1st Army, four regiments of the troops under
his command, but as a matter of fact there were only ten companies
of the Barnaul Regiment_.[113] Taking all the circumstances into
consideration, our retirement was, in my opinion, a day too late, and
instead of throwing all the reinforcements which arrived at Tsu-erh-tun
into the fight, some of them (General Zarubaeff’s force) had to be kept
as a last reserve in case the enemy attempted to close us in with a
ring of fire.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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