Korea: independence of, i. 69; necessity for quiet in, i. 72, 73; Russian activity in, i. 153, 178; timber concession, i. 170; council at Port Arthur on, i. 180, 181; the Treaty of Peking, i. 199; a vital question, i. 219 Korniloff, Admiral, siege of Sevastopol, i. 18; heroic death, i. 21 Korniloff, Lieutenant-Colonel, ii. 286 Kronstadt, fortifications of, i. 126 Kruimoff, Captain, i. 303 Kuan-tung Peninsula: Russian annexation of, i. 35, 69; Japanese land and fortify, i. 127, 257; Russian defence force, ii. 206, 207 Kuang-cheng-tzu, seizure by rebels, i. 155 Kuldja, province of, i. 70; the cession to China of, i. 92–95, 148, 149 Kuprin, M., _The Duel_, ii. 69 Kuroki, General: in command of the 1st Japanese Army, i. 257, 258; his opinion of the Russian shells, i. 306; his victory at Te-li-ssu, ii. 38; his positions, ii. 39, 40, 216, 222; his turning movement, ii. 230–232, 264; strength of his army, ii. 253; battle of Liao-yang, ii. 317; at Mukden, ii. 323,329, 332 Kuropatkin, General, Minister of War, afterwards Commander-in-Chief: his report on the possibilities of the twentieth century, i. 39; his report on the Russian frontiers and their suitability, i. 40–77; deductions from the work of the army as a guide to future wars, i. 96–110; the work before the War Department, i. 111–144; his opinion on the Manchurian and Korean questions, i. 145–198; difference of opinion with Admiral Alexeieff, i. 167–169; the Royal Timber Company, i. 172–184, ii. 306; his impressions on visiting Japan, i. 174, 175, 217–223; his reports on the Manchurian position, i. 176–179, 189–193; his responsibility for the rupture with Japan, i. 177–179; his pyramid of Russian interests, i. 185, 186; resignation on the establishment of the Viceroyalty, i. 187; his proposal to give way, i. 189; his report on strength of Japanese army, i. 242; on necessity for Russian railway improvements, i. 252–254, 263–268; on mobilization, i. 271–289; on reserve of officers, i. 293, 294; his recommendations as to officers, i. 301–305; on machine-guns and ammunition, i. 306–309; his criticisms of staff work, ii. 2, 3; of cavalry, ii. 4; of attack and the defence, ii. 5, 6; of column formation in attack, ii. 6; on the work of the artillery and sappers, ii. 7, 8; on criticism by commanders, ii. 9; on tactical instruction of our troops, ii. 10; his supplementary and monthly instructions, ii. 12, 13, 15–22; reasons for the reverses at Plevna, ii. 13, 14; his diagram of, and opinion on, the relative positions in Manchuria, ii. 33–44; on difficulties in organization, ii. 44–60; on defects in _personnel_, ii. 60–72; on the rank and file and Social Revolutionists, ii. 72–81; on the countermanding of orders, ii. 81–84;