The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
As senior officers get on in the service, they must not be allowed to
forget what they have previously learnt, a thing which is now only
too common. It is essential that they should be practised in peace
in commanding troops, and not be mere administrators, inspectors,
spectators, and umpires. They should therefore be in a position to
spend most of their time with troops in the field and in cantonments.
With our military system the command of troops is at present almost
entirely in the hands of the regimental, brigade, divisional, corps and
district commanders.[31] Thus our infantry and cavalry regiments used
to be under five masters. But, in the words of the proverb, too many
cooks spoil the broth, and in war all was not for the best in all our
regiments. Often while the ingredients and the fire left nothing to be
desired, the cooks did not know what to do. How can such a state of
things be explained? It will be said that the selection of commanders
was not always happy. That is true; but it must be remembered that
selections had to be made from those men who were qualified according
to the regulations and the reports drawn up by various commanding
officers. In some cases seniority was considered to be by itself
a qualification for promotion. Efforts of a sort were undoubtedly
made to get the best men we had, but they were insufficient. All
the commanders in the five degrees of our military hierarchy are so
occupied with their daily work of routine and correspondence, while
many are so overburdened with the administrative details of their
appointments, that they have little time to attend to the business of
actual war. Yet, as they get on in the service, more knowledge of war
is required of them. The short periods of concentration in summer,
with only a few days of instructional work on both sides, give little
practice in command, and at other times the number of responsible
duties connected with administration places that art on a far higher
plane than mere soldiering. And what is most important is that the
whole of our service—of our lives almost—is spent doing things which
do not go to form character. Of the five posts above mentioned, only
two—the divisional and corps commanders—are in any way independent,
and their occupants are immersed in office work. The relative amount
of time spent on the different sorts of duties tends to turn the
regimental commander into an administrator rather than a fighter,
while a brigade commander has absolutely no independence; in fact, his
absence or presence is scarcely noticed. Finally, the same tendency
to produce office men and bureaucrats is noticeable even in the work
of those on the highest rungs of the ladder—the general officers in
command of military districts. Instances might be multiplied of men
who, though long in charge of military districts, never once commanded
troops on manœuvres, and for several years never even got astride a
horse.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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