The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
How can this impossible state of affairs be remedied, and a body
of leaders, constantly practised in the execution of those duties in
command of troops that would be required of them in war, be formed?
I.
On active service the rôle of the regimental commander is both wide
and important. To issue successfully from the test of modern war, he
must have character, experience, and facility in manœuvring his unit
in the field, must know his men well, and therefore have found the
time both for intercourse with his officers and for perfecting himself
in his profession. In battle it is men he has to deal with, and not
files of papers and storehouses. But, situated as he is at present, he
is so overburdened with important administrative details that most of
his time is passed dealing with requisitions and inventories instead
of with flesh and blood. The penalties he incurs by neglect of his
administrative duties are far heavier and more tangible than those
incurred by neglecting the tactical training of his regiment. The
greater part of these duties—those such as are connected with clothing,
transport, and rationing—should be removed from his shoulders. He
should be made the controller of these sections of duty, and not the
person actually responsible. Nor is his position easy in respect
to the _personnel_. The great shortage of officers, especially in
those units quartered in inferior barracks, is the cause of many
difficulties. When mobilization is ordered, some of the already too
small number of officers are told off for the innumerable miscellaneous
duties and detachments; commanders of battalions and of companies are
interchanged; many of the men are transferred to other units, a mass
of reservists join, and, if there is not time for the new arrivals to
settle down with the few old hands, the commander has to lead into
action a regiment which he does not know, and which does not know
itself. Our mobilization schemes, therefore, require revision in this
respect, and every regiment should have in peace-time a permanent
establishment of officers and men who would accompany the regiment on
service. The company commanders in particular should not be removed
from their companies. But to make such an arrangement possible, it is
essential that one of the senior captains (who might be appointed to
the staff) should run the regimental school. It is also important to
keep the regimental commander as a man apart as far as possible; he
should be made to realize upon all occasions the peculiar importance of
the duties entrusted to him, and the respect due to himself personally
by reason of these duties.
II.
In Manchuria, just as in the wars of the second half of last century,
the great value of the infantry brigade as an independent fighting
unit came out strongly in all the large battles; as also did the great
influence of its commander on the result of the fight.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account