Army corps commanders are quite independent, but, like the divisional commanders, are overburdened with routine correspondence, etc., and do not get sufficient practice in commanding troops in the field. Some, during a tour of duty of several years, have never commanded troops on manœuvres; and it is impossible for all of them to have sufficient acquaintance with cavalry, as some corps do not include this arm. They and their staff, especially the General Staff officers, have no practice at all, or else very little, in the use of technical equipment and the modern aids to warfare (telegraphs, telephones, mines, motors, balloons, etc.). The experience of the late war showed up the necessity of increasing the establishment of the army corps, and the actions of their commanders will have such an important, and in many cases deciding, influence, that extremely careful selection is necessary for these posts; the men appointed must be capable of teaching others as well as of learning themselves. As with the divisional generals, so should the powers of corps commanders be extended at the expense of those now exercised by officers in command of military districts. V. The commanders of military districts are the senior officers actually in charge of troops, and have at the same time important duties as administrative heads of districts. Here again administrative work, together with correspondence connected with the troops, occupies the greater part of their time, and only in exceptionally favourable circumstances (the large manœuvres with concentrations of troops from different districts) can they get any practice in commanding in the field. But as they also have to perform the duties of Governor-General, they are not able to devote sufficient time to the troops, even in inspecting them, or to improving themselves. I am absolutely convinced that, however much such a combination of two appointments—each of which requires a man of exceptional ability and character—may be desirable from the political point of view, it has the gravest disadvantages for the army. There is a limit to human power. As our governor-generals devote the greater part of their time and energies to civil matters, they entrust a large part of their military duties to the chief staff-officers of the districts. It can easily be understood that such an arrangement is not in the interests of the army. For instance, the most important military district—that of Warsaw—was, as far as the army was concerned, neglected in the time of several governor-generals. Indeed, at one time, much to the subversion of the authority of officers in command of districts and corps, the troops in this area were controlled by the chief of the district staff! Therefore, if we wish that the commanders of military districts—our most natural selections for the command of armies in war—should have time to prepare themselves for this important duty, _we should free them from civil