The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
It is never easy to turn in a short time an ignorant, illiterate
recruit into an intelligent and keen soldier, capable of individual
action; and the recent reduction[33] of the term of service has made
the task still harder. The greatest difficulty, however, is to get good
non-commissioned officers; even with the four to five year period with
the colours we were not able to do this satisfactorily. The mass of
our recruits are so illiterate, and so much book knowledge is required
in the schools from our non-commissioned officers, that there is a
natural tendency to pick the men for these posts on account of their
education and outward sharpness. This is a mistake, as these qualities
are often superficial. The simple recruits of the deepest and strongest
characters are usually slow and uncouth and do not shine externally;
consequently many of them never become selected for non-commissioned
rank, and finish their service as private soldiers. But a surly man
of some character often makes a better soldier than his smarter
comrade. With the reduced term of service we can do nothing without
a considerable number of time-expired men. The present conditions
under which these men are kept on in the ranks are sound enough, but
the men dislike doing time-expired, or what they characterize as
“mercenary,” service. We must get over this dislike, and therefore
as much as possible raise the position of sergeant-major and other
non-commissioned officers.
Another burning question, and one with which we shall be confronted
more and more in the future, is how to keep the destructive tenets of
the revolutionary parties out of our barracks. Drastic action will of
course be taken, but if we do not succeed in crushing these parties
among the people, we can hardly expect to be able to keep the army from
infection.
One of the most important requirements with our short term of service
is that our men should not be taken away from their work for police
duties. The part so frequently taken by the troops in putting down
civil disorders by force of arms is particularly harmful to discipline.
To turn to another point, owing to the inadequate funds allotted, our
soldiers have always been treated worse than those of other armies.
The Germans, for instance, spend twice as much per head upon the
maintenance of their army as we do. Some improvement in this direction
has already been made, especially in the feeding. With a serviceable
cadre of time-expired sergeant-majors and non-commissioned officers,
and with the living conditions of the men improved, we can face the
future calmly even with a three-year term of service. But we shall
only succeed if we relieve the troops of the large amount of extra
regimental work which falls to them (tailoring, shoemaking, and other
workshop work, care of reserve stores, etc.), and if we lighten their
guard duties. Our recruits are free from this work and from guards only
in the first year of service.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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