In the earlier fights the work of the artillery varied a good deal, and was not very successful; but as they gained experience, many batteries fought splendidly, not only against guns, but against rifle-fire. Compared with the work of our artillery in 1877–78 (in the European theatre of operations), we have made considerable progress in skill, and the very heavy losses in killed and wounded in many batteries prove that our gunners know how to die. The horse artillery work depended entirely on the commanders of the cavalry units to which the batteries were attached, and when these commanders really meant fighting the batteries did good work. As a proof of this, it is enough to recall the gallant conduct of the 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery attached to Mischenko’s Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade. This battery and its young commander were known to the whole army; more than once it successfully fought several of the enemy’s batteries, and yet its losses were insignificant. Sometimes our cavalry leaders were unnecessarily anxious to retire, as was the case in the cavalry of the 2nd Army at the battle of Mukden, when the two batteries which were with it lost _only two men wounded and one missing in eleven days’ fighting_. One six-gun battery was sufficient for four mounted regiments of such strength as we had. As said above, there should be one artillery regiment of four batteries (48 guns) with each infantry division, or a total of 144 guns for the three divisions. These three regiments would be organized in a brigade. There should also be one regiment of 24 howitzers with each corps. CAVALRY. Though our cavalry was numerous, its work hardly came up to our expectations, but where it was properly commanded it did well enough. In my opinion, the main reform that is necessary in the cavalry is to improve their training. Till it is educated to feel that it should fight as _obstinately as infantry_, the money expended on our mounted Arm will be thrown away. If infantry can still continue fighting after losing 50 per cent. of their strength, cavalry should be able to do the same. In action we nursed the cavalry too much; out of action we did not take sufficient care of it. Though they had not lost a man, whole regiments were moved to the rear as soon as the first shrapnel began bursting near them. The four regiments of cavalry—two dragoon and two Cossack—on whom fell the most difficult but the most honourable duty of obtaining information and opposing the leading units of Nogi’s enveloping forces at the battle of Mukden, lost in killed and wounded: