The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
I repeat that the tasks which fall upon infantry in battle nowadays are
of such exceptional difficulty that the promotion of its officers for
distinguished field service should be made exceptionally rapid. I am
aware that even a good regimental commander may make a bad divisional
general; but I also maintain that a regimental commander who has
successfully commanded in several fights, has shown a knowledge of
his work, keenness, enterprise, and personal bravery, and has won the
confidence of his men, should be promoted as quickly as possible. He
may find it difficult at first to get his bearings under the new and
more complicated conditions of a high command, where he has to rely
upon maps and the reports of others instead of upon the direct evidence
of his own eyes and ears, but still he will grapple with the situation,
even of an army corps commander, far better than some general whose
experience has been confined to office-work and peace manœuvres.
Finally, in order to give due importance to the principal Arm—infantry
(infantry of the Line in particular)—I consider the following measures
necessary:
1. To give a better education to the officers entering it.
2. To improve their material and social position.
3. To provide officers and men with a smarter uniform.
4. To accelerate their promotion and put an end to the system by which
Guardsmen and officers of the General Staff get more rapid advancement,
and so block the way of their unfortunate brothers to regimental and
divisional commands.
5. To facilitate as much as possible the special promotion in war of
distinguished company officers to field rank.
6. To award regimental commanders who display particular merit on
service rapid advancement to the rank of General, without regard to
their seniority or the speed of their promotion.
The two last of these recommendations also obviously apply to officers
of the other Arms.
ORGANIZATION.
In my opinion, our experiences in the recent war have shown the
necessity for such an organization in our army as I will now describe:
_Infantry Regiment_: To consist of 4 battalions, each of 4 companies.
Each company to have a strength of 250 combatants. In addition to the
16 combatant companies per regiment, there should be scout sections
(mounted and dismounted), and machine-gun sections with 16 portable
guns. Strength of regiment, 5,000 men.
_Cavalry and Cossack Regiments_: As at present.
_Infantry Brigade_: 2 regiments, 8 battalions.
_Cavalry Brigade_: 2 regiments, 12 squadrons or _sotnias_.
All brigades should be capable of acting independently.
_Infantry Division_: To consist of 2 infantry brigades, 1 regiment of
artillery,[47] 1 sapper battalion, 1 telegraph company, 2 squadrons or
_sotnias_ of cavalry, transport company, parks, bakeries, hospitals.
Total, 17 battalions, 48 guns, and 2 squadrons or _sotnias_.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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