The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
The proposals set forth above, which it is thought would tend to
increase our fighting efficiency, are, after all, only details of
organization and of preparation. The main factors contributing to
insure victory are the same as they always have been—a high _moral_
and the power of rapid concentration in superior strength. Diplomacy
must prepare for the struggle so as to enable all the armed forces of
the Empire to be put into the field if necessary, and we must have
numerous efficient railways to facilitate the rapid massing of superior
numbers. On these two most important factors will depend the plan
of campaign. The ability to assume the offensive bestows an immense
superiority, for it gives the initiative to the side which undertakes
it. The defender’s leading troops are compelled to fall back, his
less prepared troops are perhaps crushed, while his reinforcements
are destroyed piecemeal. The result is that the _moral_ of the
attacker increases, while that of the enemy inevitably diminishes. To
re-establish a balance under such conditions is not only a matter of
time, but is extremely difficult. With a defensive plan of operations,
unshakeable belief in eventual success and immense patience are
necessary in order to overcome all difficulties, and to defeat the foe
with a final assumption of the offensive.
From the short sketch I have given of what was accomplished by the
Russian armed forces in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it
is seen that we took the offensive in the majority of the wars we
were engaged in. Without railways, but with a large peace standing
army (period of service twenty-five years with the colours), with
equality and often a superiority[52] in armament and training, Russia
was able to commence operations, and to force her will upon the
enemy—_i.e._, to assume the offensive. Nowadays we have been left
behind by our Western neighbours in readiness for hostilities, and
the recent war disclosed the fact that we had been outdistanced by
our Eastern neighbour also. Russia will, no doubt, in time find the
strength and means once more to take her former place amongst other
Powers as regards fighting efficiency; but it will take years of
unceasing effort, for rapid concentration and an offensive strategy are
impossible without great developments in our railway system. No one can
say whether we shall be allowed to wait for everything to be perfected,
or whether we shall again be drawn into war before we are ready. It is
therefore absolutely necessary to prepare without loss of time to make
war under conditions as unfavourable as those of the recent conflict.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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