(_a_) The delay in mobilizing the reinforcements for the Far East. (_b_) The transfer into the reserve during the war of well-trained soldiers—men who were still liable for colour service—from the military districts in European Russia, while untrained elderly reservists were being sent to the front. (_c_) The belated despatch of drafts to the front. (The reason of this was also the inefficiency of the railways.) (_d_) The delay in promoting those who particularly distinguished themselves in the field. (Many recommendations were ignored.) (_e_) The deficiencies in our technical equipment. (_f_) The faults of organization (absence of troops for protecting communications, dearth of transport, unwieldiness of the army and corps organizations). (_g_) Deficiencies in the _personnel_ both of officers and men. The third group comprises— (_a_) The absence of a true military feeling among the troops. (_b_) The poor spirit in action shown by some of them. (_c_) The lack of determination on the part of commanders of all degrees to carry out the tasks entrusted to them. (_d_) The breakdown of the organization under the stress of war. The weak points of our forces, which were so noticeable in the wars waged in the second half of the last century, had not been entirely eliminated during the fifty years which intervened since the Crimea, and were again evident in the recent struggle—namely: 1. We were inferior to our enemy in technical troops and equipment. 2. The “command” was unsatisfactory. 3. The army was insufficiently trained tactically. 4. We did not insure victory by having considerable superiority in numbers. We did not have before us any clear idea of our object, and consequently did not show sufficient determination in its prosecution. So many different reasons have been advanced for our failure that the question naturally arises as to what foundation there really is for my opinion—shared by the greater part of the army in the field—that if we had not concluded peace so hastily victory would have crowned our arms. My belief that we could, and ought to, have issued victorious from the struggle is based upon— I. The steady growth of our material forces. II. The growth of our moral forces. III. The gradual deterioration of the enemy in both respects. I.