The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
Though an improvement of _moral_ is by no means as easy to bring about
in an army as that of its material condition, the officers who were
most in touch with our men were convinced that it was done in our
case. It may possibly be a peculiarity of the Russian soldier that
he possesses latent moral strength of the kind which is developed
slowly, and not destroyed by any trials to which the individual is
subjected; but to those who made a study of the war it appeared
perfectly clear that our men showed an increasing spirit of stubborn
determination as the campaign progressed. In the early fights before
the battle of Liao-yang—at Te-li-ssu and Ta-shih-chiao—we withdrew
after comparatively small losses. At the latter fight two army corps,
and at Yang-tzu-ling one corps, retired, though they together did not
collectively lose as many men as the 1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment
alone lost in the battle of Mukden. At Liao-yang our men fought better
than in the previous fights; on the Sha Ho they showed a better spirit
than at Liao-yang; while at Mukden many units showed a still further
improvement. We were all convinced, therefore, that in a defence of,
or an offensive advance from, the Hsi-ping-kai position, the men would
fight even better than at Mukden, for the improvement in spirit shown
by our troops had been progressive and steady. They had learned much,
particularly during their long stay in direct touch with the enemy
on the Sha Ho. Even the reserve units, which failed in the early
fights, fought with great bravery and steadiness at Mukden. To prove
this, it is only necessary to recall the exploits of the 71st and
54th Divisions, the later arrived reserve units of the 55th and 61st
Divisions at Mukden, and of many regiments of the 10th, 17th, and 1st
Army Corps. The regiments of the 4th Siberian Corps and the East
Siberian Rifles, indeed, were an example throughout the war.
The Tsar, in his Order to the army and fleet of January 14,
1905, predicted this improvement in the _moral_ of the troops,
notwithstanding their reverses, with great foresight. His belief in the
spirit of the army was expressed in the following memorable words:
“Though we may be sore at heart on account of the disasters and
losses that have befallen us, do not let us be discouraged. By
them Russia’s strength is renewed, and her power increased.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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