But so powerless to fulfill their purposes had these paper pledges become, so far was the open-door doctrine from settling the situation, that in China’s own territory, where by solemn promises of both parties no special privileges could accrue, the year 1904 saw two Powers in the throes of the greatest war of modern times. If the realization of the combatants’ purpose has signified much to the nations of the West,--perhaps rather to the United States, for the others nursed no illusions,--to China it has meant far more. It has brought for the first time a real and general appreciation of the necessity for modernized, efficient self-defense. Fifteen years of aggression have been needed to drive home this knowledge. While the defeats of 1895 came as a blow to a few keen-minded Chinese, to most they were a matter of entire indifference. China was not conquered, they reasoned: only two provinces took part while the viceroys of the rest looked idly on. “That Shan-tung man’s war” was the general attitude; “Li Hung Chang’s boats beaten.” When it was over, merely Formosa, the little-valued island of “tame barbarians,” had been lost. The traditional policy of playing off the jealous powers one against the other had apparently succeeded; it had cleared the Japanese from Corea and Port Arthur. China as a nation was hardly touched, and multitudes of people never knew there had been a war. The seizures of 1897-1899, coming close upon each other, exasperated, but taught no lesson. The mass of Chinese, and even those in high official circles, believed that a little effort would drive the foreign devils into the sea. The march of the Allies to Peking stunned them. It was their first facing of the fact. [Illustration: HSUEN-WU GATE, PEKING] The Russo-Japanese War, and the partition of the province that had cradled their Emperor’s dynasty, dissipated their fool’s paradise. It was seen then, clearly, by all, that China’s only hope of maintaining her integrity lay in her defensive power. With the object, not of securing the blessings of civilization (which the overwhelming majority of Chinamen desire no more than we do the Holy Inquisition), but of beating away the spoilsmen, the Peking rulers turned at length to the survey of their actual military condition. As this concerns intimately the Chinese internal situation, a summary of it may be pertinent.