There were other cases reported of the slaughter of noncombatants. The aggregate of those people killed was said to have reached 25,000. See _Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 261, which gives a list of these cases in detail. Footnote 284: The _Kokumin_, March 8, 1901, etc. Footnote 285: See the reports of the British Consuls Hosie and Fulford and the American Consul Miller, in _China, No. 5 (1900)_, p. 47; _No. 2 (1904)_, pp. 29–33, etc.; and the 57th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. pp. 147–158. At one time the relations between the American sailors and citizens and the Russian authorities were wrought up to a high tension, and Mr. Miller used so strong language in his correspondence with the latter that he had to be warned by Minister Conger of Peking and Assistant Secretary Pierce at Washington. Footnote 286: See _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 258–262. Footnote 287: Count Lamsdorff said on November 22, 1903, to Mr. Kurino, Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, that “Russia once took possession of Manchuria by right of conquest....” The _Kwampō_, March 24, 1904, supplement, p. 8. CHAPTER VII NORTH CHINA AND MANCHURIA The problem stated at the close of the last chapter forms an index to a period of Eastern diplomacy the singular features of which hardly find a parallel in the world’s history. The affairs of the Extreme Orient had in general advanced to such a stage that no single Power could again seek to enforce its will without due regard to the interests of some other Powers. The Russian problem in Manchuria was, as will be seen after a little reflection, of such a nature that it could hardly be literally propounded before the world. The absorption of a vast and rich territory in China by a Power whose policy was known to be aggressive would at once arouse a determined protest of the Powers which were, from interest and from conviction, committed to the principles of the integrity of the Chinese Empire and the open door therein as the best means of insuring a lasting peace in the Far East. The Manchurian question had to be developed under a disguise until it would be, if ever, safe to cast aside the veil. Hence began Russia’s long, laborious effort to explain to the critical world certain crude facts and deeds in Manchuria in the terms of some refined foreign phrases—phrases whose significance in this particular case her rivals well knew, but which they could not repudiate so long as they themselves upheld the principles indicated by those phrases. However, the moment a complex diplomatic machinery relies upon subterfuges for its success, its ingenuity will be taxed to the utmost, or its unity will be in danger. For it will not be easy to make the entire body of diplomatic agents speak the same untruths at all places and at all times. As soon as one pretext is uncovered, another must be invented, as it were, on the spur