Confirmed by the Czar on December 4/16, presented to the Ruling Senate on December 8/20, and finally published in the _Bulletins des Lois_ on December 11/23, 1896. See an English translation of their text in the _British Parliamentary Papers, Russia, No. 1 (1898)_, and _China, No. 1 (1900)_, pp. 57–61; a Japanese translation in _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 495–500. At the further extension of the railway by the agreement of March 27, 1898, supplementary statutes were promulgated on February 5, 1899. See _ibid._, pp. 516–520. Footnote 172: Articles 10–16. Footnote 173: Page 32, above. Footnote 174: The Chinese Minister to St. Petersburg at that time was appointed the first president. Footnote 175: Articles 18–27; Agreement, Article 1. Footnote 176: Article 8. Compare Art. 5 of the Agreement, which contains merely the former part of this arrangement, i. e., the protection of the railway and its appurtenances by the Chinese Government. Footnote 177: The Agreement, Art. 12; the Statutes, Art. 2. Footnote 178: The Agreement, Art. 10; the Statutes, Art. 3. Footnote 179: See p. 150, note 1, below. CHAPTER III KIAO-CHAU Kiao-chau, in the Province of Shan-tung, was, as will be remembered, a port marked in the so-called Cassini Convention for the use of the Russian squadron. Its value as a commercial and strategical _point d’appui_, as well as the greatness of the mineral wealth of Shan-tung, must have been as well known to the Germans as to the Russians.[180] How it happened that Russia forsook this important position, or, more accurately, how Germany succeeded in securing its lease without a protest from Russia, still remains to be explained. It is known, however, that the offers which had been made by China, perhaps in recognition of Germany’s service in the Liao-tung affair,[181] of a docking and coaling station on the southern coast, had been declined by Germany;[182] and also that Germany’s own attempts to secure a point on the Lappa Island near Amoy, and later in Amoy itself, had never materialized. As to Kiao-chau; the desire of Germany for its possession had henceforth been often observed by the Chinese Minister at Berlin,[183] but, for the realization of the desire, either the time was not ripe, or the susceptibilities of Russia had to be considered. Toward the latter half of 1897, however, the German Government seemed to have concluded that a general partition of China was now a likelihood, for which emergency Germany should prepare herself by obtaining a powerful foothold on the littoral. Observe the following statement made, in a retroactive manner, after the lease of Kiao-chau had been acquired, by Herr von Bülow in the Reichstag, on April 27, 1898: “Mention has been made of the partition of China. Such a partition will not be brought about by us, at any rate. All we have done is to provide that, come what